INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty)

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ALSO CALLED: The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles


The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was an 1987 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Signed in Washington, D.C. by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, it was ratified by the United States Senate on May 27, 1988 and came into force on June 1 of that year.

The treaty is formally titled The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The treaty eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges, defined as between 500-5,500 km (300-3,400 miles). By the treaty's deadline of June 1, 1991, a total of 2,692 of such weapons had been destroyed, 846 by the U.S. and 1,846 by the Soviet Union, which was much more unequal in number of INF warheads destroyed. Under the treaty both nations were allowed to inspect each other's military installations.

This treaty strongly favored the U.S. and thus it was a first major defeat of Soviet diplomacy during nuclear arms reduction talks. Many treaty provisions, such as counting Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles as equivalent to single-warhead Pershing II systems, including TR-1 Temp (SS-12) and R-400 Oka (SS-23) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) into INF the treaty—while excluding all U.S. nuclear naval cruise missiles (in which U.S. had a huge advantage over Soviet Union), and not taking into account expanded British and French nuclear arsenals—were clearly provisions unfavorable for the USSR. In sum, after the treaty's implementation the NATO again regained strategic nuclear superiority over USSR in Europe which existed before SS-20 deployment.

History

The agreement was stimulated by the Soviet deployment of their SS-20 missile from 1975 and the US response. The SS-20 replaced existing SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The longer range, greater accuracy, mobility and striking power of the new missile was perceived to alter the security of Western Europe. After discussions, NATO agreed to a two part strategy - firstly to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce their and the American INF arsenals; secondly to deploy in Europe from 1983 up to 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles. Until the late 1970s NATO had clear superiority over USSR in INF systems because Soviets possessed only liquid-fueled, single warhead, very inaccurate and easy to destroy IRBMs and a few hundreds equally outdated subsonic heavy bombers of Tu-16 and Tu-22 types. In contrast, NATO and USAFE had Mirage IV, V-force and brand-new F-111 bombers in addition to French, British, and US precise, solid propelled IRBMs and SLBMs based in Europe and on adjacent waters. So Soviet attempts to close the "INF gap" by SS-20 and Tu-22M deployment was met with NATO moves to secure Western alliance nuclear advantage in Europe thanks to GLCM and Pershing II installation.

Despite dissatisfaction with the deployment of US weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union agreed to open negotiations and preliminary discussions began in Geneva in 1980. Formal talks began in September 1981 with the US "zero-zero offer" - the complete elimination of all Pershing, GLCM, SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. Following disagreement over the exclusion of British and French delivery systems, the talks were suspended by the Soviet delegation in November 1983. In 1984, despite public protest, the US began to deploy INF systems in West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

In March 1986 negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union resumed, covering not only the INF issue but also separate discussions on strategic weapons (START I) and space issues (NST). In late 1985 both sides were moving towards limiting INF systems in Europe and Asia. On January 15, 1986, Gorbachev announced a Soviet proposal for a ban on all nuclear weapons by 2000, which included INF missiles in Europe. This was dismissed by the US and countered with a phased reduction of INF launchers in Europe and Asia to none by 1989. There would be no constraints on British and French nuclear forces.

A series of meetings in August and September 1986 culminated in the Reykjavík Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev on October 11, 1986. Both agreed in principle to remove INF systems from Europe and to equal global limits of 100 INF missile warheads. Gorbachev also proposed deeper and more fundamental changes in the strategic relationship. More detailed negotiations extended throughout 1987, aided by the decision of West Geman Chancellor Helmut Kohl in August to unilaterally remove the joint U.S.-West German Pershing IA systems. The treaty text was finally agreed in September 1987.

On February 10, 2007, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin declared that the INF Treaty no longer serves Russia's interests. On February 14, ITAR-Tass and Interfax quoted General Yuri Baluyevsky, the Russian military's chief of general staff, as saying that Russia could pull out of the INF, and that the decision would depend on the United States' actions with its proposed Ground-Based Midcourse Defense missile defense system, parts of which the U.S. plans to deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic.


Affected programs:

Specific missiles destroyed:

United States

Pershing Ib and Pershing II
BGM-109 Tomahawk (ground-launched version only)

Soviet Union

SS-4 'Sandal'
SS-5 'Skean'
SS-12 'Scaleboard'
SS-23 'Spider'
SS-20 'Saber'
SSC-X-4

See also:

Hollanditis
Woensdrecht
NATO Double-Track Decision

FULL-TEXT OF THE TREATY:


TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, requires destruction of the Parties' ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force.

In the mid-1970s the Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity with the United States. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union began replacing older intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with a new intermediate-range missile, the SS-20, bringing about what was perceived as a qualitative and quantitative change in the European security situation. The SS-20 was mobile, accurate, and capable of being concealed and rapidly redeployed. It carried three independently targetable warheads, as distinguished from the single warheads carried by its predecessors. The SS-20s 5,000 kilometer range permitted it to cover targets in Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and, from bases in the eastern Soviet Union, most of Asia, Southeast Asia, and Alaska.

In late 1977, NATOs Nuclear Planning Group ordered a study of the Alliances long-term INF modernization needs, consistent with the doctrine of flexible response. In the spring of 1979, NATO established the Special Consultative Group to formulate guiding principles for future arms control efforts involving INF. That summer, NATO produced the Integrated Decision Document, which set forth the basic aims of the Alliances INF policy. It called for complementary programs of force modernization and arms control.

On November 12, 1979, the NATO ministers unanimously adopted a "dual track" strategy to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. One track called for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce INF forces to the lowest possible level; the second track called for deployment in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of 464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise (GLCM) missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles.

Initially the Soviet Union refused to engage in preliminary talks, unless NATO revoked its deployment decision; however, by July 1980, the Soviet position changed, and preliminary discussions began in Geneva in the fall of 1980.

The U.S. approach to the negotiations, developed through extensive consultations within NATO, required that any INF agreement must: (1) provide for equality both in limits and rights between the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) be strictly bilateral and thus exclude British and French systems; (3) limit systems on a global basis; (4) not adversely affect NATOs conventional defense capability; and (5) be effectively verifiable.

Agreement to begin formal talks was reached on September 23, 1981. On November 18, President Reagan announced a negotiating proposal in which the United States would agree to eliminate its Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the Soviet Union would dismantle all of its SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s. This proposal became known as the "zero-zero offer."

At the beginning of the talks, the Soviet Union opposed the deployment of any U.S. INF missiles in Europe and proposed a ceiling of 300 "medium-range" missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft for both sides, with British and French nuclear forces counting toward the ceiling for the West.

During the first two years of the talks, which ended with a Soviet walkout on November 23, 1983, the United States continued to emphasize its preference for the "zero option" even while introducing the concept of an interim agreement based on equally low numbers of INF systems.

During 1984 there were no INF negotiations. U.S. deployments were carried out as planned in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, while preparations for deployment continued in Belgium.

In January 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed to separate but parallel negotiations on INF, strategic arms (START), and defense and space issues as part of a new bilateral forum called the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). The United States and the Soviet Union agreed that all questions regarding these three areas would be considered in their interrelationship. Negotiations would be conducted by a single delegation from each side, divided into three groups -- one for defense and space, one for START, and one for INF. Formal talks resumed in March 1985 in all three areas.

In the fall of 1985, the Soviet Union hinted at the possibility of an INF agreement independent of START or defense and space issues. As U.S. GLCM deployments continued, the Soviet Union outlined an interim INF agreement that would permit some U.S. GLCMs in Europe, but which would permit SS-20 warheads equal to the sum of all warheads on U.S., British, and French systems combined. The Soviets also offered to freeze INF systems in Asia -- contingent on U.S. acceptance of their proposals and provided the Asian strategic situation did not change.

In November of 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva, where they issued a joint statement calling for an "interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces." At the end of 1985, the United States proposed a limit of 140 launchers in Europe for both sides and proportionate reductions in Asia while emphasizing collateral constraints on shorter-range missiles, since these systems can cover the same targets as longer-range systems.

On January 15, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev announced a Soviet proposal for a three-stage program to ban nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which included elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles in Europe.

In late February 1986, the United States proposed a limit of 140 INF launchers in Europe and concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia. This proposal also called for both sides to reduce their INF missile launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50 percent in 1988 and, finally, to eliminate all INF weapons by the end of 1989. There would be no constraints on British and French nuclear forces. Moreover, as of the end of 1987, shorter-range missiles would be limited equally either to current Soviet levels existing on January 1, 1982, or to a lower level. The United States also presented an outline for comprehensive verification.

A series of high-level discussions took place in August and September 1986 followed by a meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, where the sides agreed to equal global ceilings of systems capable of carrying 100 INF missile warheads, none of which would be deployed in Europe. The Soviet Union also proposed a freeze on shorter-range missile deployments and agreed in principle to intrusive on-site verification.

Several months later, on February 28, 1987, the Soviet Union announced that it was prepared to reach a separate INF agreement. On March 4, 1987, the United States tabled a draft INF Treaty text, which reflected the agreement reached at Reykjavik, and submitted a comprehensive verification regime. In April the Soviet Union presented its own draft Treaty, and by July, it had agreed in principle to some of the provisions in the U.S. comprehensive verification regime, including data exchange, on-site observation of elimination, and on-site inspection of INF missile inventories and facilities.

In a major shift, however, the Soviet side proposed the inclusion of U.S.-owned warheads on the West German Pershing IA missile systems. The United States responded by restating that the INF negotiations were bilateral, covering only U.S. and Soviet missiles, and could not involve third-country systems or affect existing patterns of cooperation.

During April meetings with Secretary Shultz in Moscow, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed the possible elimination of U.S. and Soviet shorter-range missiles. At the June 1987 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO foreign ministers announced support for the global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. On June 15, President Reagan proposed the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet shorter-range missile systems.

On July 22, 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to a "double global zero" Treaty to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

On August 26, 1987, Chancellor Kohl announced the Federal Republic of Germany would dismantle its 72 Pershing IA missiles and not replace them with more modern weapons if the United States and the Soviet Union scrapped all of their INF missiles as foreseen in the emerging Treaty. This was a unilateral declaration by the FRG and is not part of the INF Treaty, which is a bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreement.

In September, the two sides reached agreement in principle to complete the Treaty before the end of the year. On December 8, 1987, the Treaty was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at a summit meeting in Washington. At the time of its signature, the Treaty's verification regime was the most detailed and stringent in the history of nuclear arms control, designed both to eliminate all declared INF systems entirely within three years of the Treaty's entry into force and to ensure compliance with the total ban on possession and use of these missiles.

The Treaty the United States and the Soviet Union signed at Washington on December 8 includes the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data,1 the Protocol on Inspections, and the Protocol on Elimination. Because of concerns raised by the Senate during the ratification hearings, and because of issues that arose during technical consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the spring of 1988, this package was augmented by three exchanges of diplomatic notes (one on May 12, 1988 and two on May 21, 1988) and an agreed minute signed May 12, 1988.

The Senate resolution of ratification required the President, prior to exchanging instruments of ratification, to obtain Soviet agreement that the four documents "are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty." This was done through an exchange of notes on May 28, 1988. The Treaty entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification in Moscow on June 1, 1988.

The May 12 and May 28 exchanges of notes, as well as the May 12 agreed minute, are included herein following the texts of the Treaty, the MOU and the Protocols. The May 21 exchange of notes, which corrected errors in the site diagrams and Treaty text, are not included, but the textual corrections are listed following the text of the Treaty, MOU and protocols.

Article XIII established the Special Verification Commission (SVC). The SVC serves as a forum for discussing and resolving implementation and compliance issues, for considering additional procedures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, and for determining the characteristics and methods of use of inspection equipment as anticipated by Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection. The sides resolved many of those issues during the first SVC session and agreed to utilize the agreements reached until such time as a document embodying them was signed by the two sides.

During the third session of the SVC (December 1988), the sides signed an Agreed Statement on inspection procedures at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk and a Memorandum of Understanding on operating procedures for the SVC.

To confirm the declared inventory of INF systems throughout the three-year elimination period and for ten years thereafter, the INF Treaty established various types of on-site inspections, among these are, baseline inspections, to confirm the initial data update; closeout inspections of facilities and missile operation bases at which INF activity ceased; short-notice (quota) inspections of declared and formerly declared facilities, and elimination inspections to confirm elimination of INF systems in accordance with agreed procedures.

In addition the United States also received the right to monitor, on a continuous basis for up to 13 years, the access (or portals) to any Soviet facility manufacturing a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), not covered under the INF Treaty, which has a stage outwardly similar to a stage of a GLBM limited by the Treaty. The Soviets received a similar right to monitor the U.S. facility that previously produced the Pershing rocket motor.

The U.S. On-Site Inspection (OSIA) was established January 15, 1988, inter alia, to coordinate and implement the inspection provisions of the Treaty. Baseline inspections were conducted in 1988 by U.S. and Soviet inspectors to verify the data provided by the United States and Soviet Union on the number and locations of their respective INF systems and facilities.

In late April and early May 1991, the United States eliminated its last ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched ballistic missile covered under the INF Treaty. The last declared Soviet SS-20 was eliminated on May 11, 1991. A total of 2,692 missiles was eliminated after the Treaty's entry-into-force.

Following the December 25, 1991, dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States sought to secure continuation of full implementation of the INF Treaty regime and to multilateralize the INF Treaty with twelve former Soviet republics which the United States considers INF Treaty successors.2 Of the twelve successor states, six -- Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan -- have inspectable INF facilities on their territory. Of these six, four -- Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine -- are active participants in the process of implementing the Treaty. With the agreement of the other Parties, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, each with only one inspectable site on its territory, while participants, have assumed a less active role, foregoing attendance at sessions of the SVC and participation in inspections.

The multilateralizing of what was previously a bilateral U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty required establishing agreements between the United States and the governments of the relevant Soviet successor states on numerous issues. In the SVC and through diplomatic contacts with the actively participating successor states, the United States worked to secure agreements to ensure continuation of the viability of the Treaty regime and to assure the exercise by the United States of its rights under the Treaty.

Among the tasks undertaken were: arrangements for the settlement of costs connected with implementation activities in the new, multilateral Treaty context; the establishment of new points of entry (POE's) in Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine through which to conduct inspections of the former INF facilities in those countries; and the establishment of communications links between the United States and those countries for transmission of various Treaty-related notifications.

Other issues that have been discussed in the SVC include multilateral operating procedures for the SVC's concurrent continuous monitoring under the START I and INF Treaties, and inspection procedures for new missiles exiting from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia.

__________________________

1 A comprehensive data exchange took place at the time the Treaty was signed. This MOU included the numbers and locations of all Treaty-limited items, as well as their technical characteristics. All categories of data in the MOU are updated at six-month intervals for the duration of the Treaty.

2 The United States did not consider the Baltic states to be successors, since it had never recognized the legality of their incorporation into the Soviet Union.

LINK:

http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf1.html#treaty

About GECF - Gas OPEC

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About GECF - Gas OPEC

Gas exporters will meet in Tehran on 28-th of April to debate the statute of an organization for gas exporting states, said Valerie Yazov, head of the Russian Gas Association.

It looks like Putin again threatens the US with the establishment of a gas cartel amongst the 15 GECF members, in order to try to restore the phase of the "European" negotiation with the US, when meetings of the trio Putin-Chirac-Schroeder were currently held.

If Bush will behave well and will negotiate with Putin for the acceptance in the EU of the socialist system, backed by economical dependence of some EU states on the Russian gas, the things will go smooth and the gas OPEC will not be legally created, hence Russia will not rise gas prices very much if the US will be cooperative and the negotiation on Europe will take place.

If Bush will oppose to the presence of Russia in Europe, like he did by now, Putin will continue to threaten with the creation of the gas OPEC.

Russia will go step by step and will first propose the creation of IANNGO, which is a diluted version of the GECF, nongovernmental vs. intergovernmental.

~Vera

DEFINITIONS:

1) GEFC

GECF = Gas Exporting Countries Forum

The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) is an organization of world's leading gas producers, which was established in Tehran in 2001. The aims of the GECF are:

to foster the concept of mutuality of interests by favouring dialogue between producers, between producers and consumers and between governments and energy-related industries;

to provide a platform to promote study and exchange of views;

to promote a stable and transparent energy market.

The GECF has no official statute or charter.

The forum doesn't have fixed membership structure, however Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad & Tobago, the UAE and Venezuela could be identified as current members.


Turkmenistan, Bolivia, Indonesia, Libya and Oman have participated at different ministerial meetings. Norway has status of observer.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_Exporting_Countries_Forum

2) IANNGO

IANNGO = The International Alliance of Nongovernmental Natural Gas Organizations.

The IANNGO, in the conception of its organizers, would "create condition for the just distribution of income from the export of gas between producers and countries that transport gas, and form common investment sources for the development of the gas industry."

The main difference between IANNGO and GECF is that the former will unite "nongovernmental gas organizations and leading gas companies of the countries producing and transporting natural gas," while the latter is an intergovernmental structure.

http://www.kommersant.com/p884944/r_528/natural_gas_supplies/

MAIN QUOTES:

"The main difference between IANNGO and GECF is that the former will unite "nongovernmental gas organizations and leading gas companies of the countries producing and transporting natural gas," while the latter is an intergovernmental structure." - Kommersant

"There were two draft charters, a 'tough' one designed by Iran, and Russia's 'more delicate' version. Iran has proposed to regulate the functioning and principles of a gas equivalent of OPEC, while Russia's draft envisages fixing gas pricing mechanisms and gas transit routs." - RIA Novosti

"A senior Russian Industry and Energy official told Kommersant it was not clear whether the emergence of the cartel would be announced at the Moscow forum." - RIA Novosti

"Strategically, it is important for Russia not to overdo with the talk about a gas cartel. The emergence of an influential union of gas producers may seriously upset the balance of forces and interests, and become a reason for major conflicts and confrontation between energy producers and consumers." - RIA Novosti - 11/ 04/ 2007

"As soon as Russia announced South Stream, Iran said it was ready to become the resource base for Nabucco and began making bilateral contracts for gas delivery to the EU on the Transadriatic Gas Pipeline from Turkey to Greece and, eventually, to Italy," - Kommersant


"Russia holds the world's largest gas reserves (47.8 billion cubic meters), followed by Iran (26.7 billion cubic meters) and Qatar (23.7 billion cubic meters)." -Asia Times Online

"Russia controls no less than 21.6% of the world's natural-gas production, well ahead of Algeria (3.2%), Iran (3.1%), Indonesia (2.8%) and Malaysia (2.2%). Russia above all wants to become a huge global exporter: for the moment it exports only a third of its production. Iran, incredible as it might seem, imports more from Turkmenistan than it exports to Turkey - because of investment problems. Like Russia, Iran's aim is to become a major global exporter." - Asia Times Online

"In May 2006, Gazprom deputy chairman Aleksandr Medvedev had thrown a news bomb, saying that if Russia didn't get a good energy deal with the European Union it would create "an alliance of gas suppliers more influential than OPEC"." - Asia Times Online

"Russia wants to concentrate on Europe. But the Europeans would do anything to diversify their sources, so Iran, in the end, will also be the winner." - Asia Times Online

"It would all depend on a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear dossier - which is in the interests of the gas-hungry European Union. Diplomats in Brussels never stop swearing that the EU's ultimate fear is to become a hostage to Russia's energy policy. The alternative supplier is definitely Iran." - Asia Times Online

"Until Russia completes the North European Gas Pipeline, which will pump gas directly to Germany, and establishes its own liquefied natural gas facilities, it will remain dependent on transit countries for gas exports. At the same time, it is a transit country for Central Asian gas going to Europe. Given such circumstances, it is difficult to discuss a coordinated pricing policy following the OPEC model." - RIA Novosti

Iran's proven natural gas reserves total over 28 trillion cubic meters. In 2006, gas production in the republic was 105 billion cu m, with consumption standing at 105.1 billion cu m. - RIA Novosti

Gazprom plans to join the Green Stream project (50% owned by Italy's Eni), which is to link Africa and Europe (from Libya to Sicily), and is considering the option of a gas pipeline to run in parallel. - RIA Novosti

Mikhail Korchemkin, director of East European Gas Analysis, said that Gazprom's segment of global gas output would fall from 19% in 2007 to 13% in 2030. "Gazprom can keep its influence on world markets only by selling gas produced in other countries," he said. "Libya is therefore interesting to it not only as a tappable resource, but perhaps also as a transit country for the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline from Nigeria, which has more proven reserves than Turkmenistan." - RIA Novosti

Analysts say that the agreements Gazprom reached in Libya could set the European community seriously agog, worried as it is by Gazprom's growing international stance. "Gazprom's participation in the Libyan gas projects will enable it to enter south European markets, where its holding is as yet weak," - RIA Novosti

"Gazprom and Algeria's Sonatrach signed a memorandum of understanding calling for coordinated gas prices." -Asia Times Online

By 2008, Qatar will be the world's premier supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG). - Asia Times Online


SEE ALSO: Iran again in the Spotlight
http://putinfreakshow.blogspot.com/2008/04/iran-again-in-spotlight.html

From Wikipedia:

Quote:

"Since the establishment of the GECF in 2001, there has always been speculation, particularly in Europe, that the world's largest producers of natural gas, in particular Russia and Iran, intend to create a gas cartel equivalent to OPEC which would set quotas and prices.

The idea of a gas OPEC was first floated by Russian President Vladimir Putin and backed by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev in 2002. In May 2006 Gazprom deputy chairman Alexander Medvedev threatened that Russia would create "an alliance of gas suppliers that will be more influential than OPEC" if Russia did not get its way in energy negotiations with Europe."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_Exporting_Countries_Forum#Membership


==========================================



Full-length articles:


Gas exporters to meet in Tehran tomorrow

Date: Sunday, April 27, 2008
Source: IranOilGas.com
Tehran is hosting the gas exporting countries forum, at experts’ level, on coming Monday 28 April 2008. According to an official of Iran’s oil ministry, the forum will be debating the structure of the organization of gas exporting countries, reported the local news agencies. He said the Tehran forum will not be attended by any ministers.
Valerie Yazov, head of the Russian Gas Association, had lately said the ministers of gas exporting countries would be meeting in Tehran to debate the statute of an organization for gas exporting states.

http://www.iranoilgas.com/news/details2/?type=news&p=current&newsID=1953&restrict=no


==========

Russia Takes a Charter to Iran

Kommersant has learned that, during a session of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Tehran on April 28, Russia will present a draft charter for that organization, which it has long dreamed of turning into a "gas OPEC."
Moscow's formulation of the tasks and goals of the GECF is softer than Iran's proposal, which was similar to the charter of OPEC.
The organization is to become an international platform for the development of a formula for the price of gas and discussion of routes for new pipelines.
Experts say it will be hard for the potential participants in the gas OPEC to agree among themselves. That means that the June forum in Moscow may not be a success.
Russian-Style CartelA source in the Russian government told Kommersant that a draft charter of the GECF was sent to the appropriate agencies of the 15 member states late last week. According to the source, the document was authored by the Ministry of Industry and Energy and Gazprom at the end of last year and spent three months being conciliated in the ministries. A Gazprom spokesman confirmed on Friday that "A draft charter is being discussed. It is to be considered at the next ministerial session of the GECF." The charter is the first in the process started last autumn of turning the GECF from an amorphous entity into a powerful gas suppliers' lobby along the lines of OPEC.According to information obtained by Kommersant, the draft charter will be presented by Deputy Minister of Industry and Energy Anatoly Yanovsky at a high-level GECF committee session in Tehran on April 28. Yanovsky himself declined to comment.
Another Kommersant informant commented that the nature of its developers shaped the nature of the document, which proposes the necessity of creating an international platform for development of a universal formula for the price of gas, the use of spot deliveries with the goal compensating for shortages of volume in the course of fulfilling long-term contracts, determination of the expediency of the construction of new gas pipelines taking account of the forecast risk."The GECF was first held in Tehran in 2001. He does not have a charter, exact membership system or permanent representation in any country. Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela continually take part in GECF sessions, and Turkmenistan has participated in some. Norway is considered an observer.
The official goal of the organization is the development of mutual understanding between producers and consumers and governments and industrial sectors connected with energy and the creation of a stable and transparent fuel market. At the last forum, in Doha, the GECF member states agreed to form a committee on a high level that would meet every two months to discuss gas trade issues. It was also decided that the next forum would meet in Moscow in 2008.A Gazprom spokesman explained that details on the platform for dialog are still "in the discussion stage."
Apparently, Moscow is expecting members of the transformed GECF to coordinate gas prices and agree on the routes of new gas pipelines. Gazprom and the Ministry of Industry and Energy deny that there will be nay analogy between GECF and OPEC, however. "We do not need a cartel agreement," the source claimed.Moderation Moscow-StyleApparently, Moscow's current initiative is a response to a proposal for the future of the GECF made by Iran at the end of last year.
Sources in the Russian government and Gazprom told Kommersant that the Iranian draft charter was largely copied from that of OPEC. The document proposed by Tehran was examined by the Russian ministries, but many of them gave it a negative assessment. The Russian Foreign Ministry was especially critical of it. Russian diplomats pointed out that support of the initiative would have a number of negative political consequences.The Foreign Ministry's was correct in its conclusions. In the West, conversations over the creation of a "gas OPEC" stir up strong reactions.
In April of last year, a week before the GECF session in Doha, the deputy chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Ileana Ros-Lehtinen wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice vigorously demanding that she "make clear to all concerned that any movement to establish yet another menace to the world's energy supplies will have sharply negative consequences for all of those involved."
Ros-Lehtinen's call was supported by many in Congress and official spokesmen of the State Department and White House made a number of strongly-worded statements about a "gas OPEC." The European Union was no less categorical. Not wanting to anger its partners needlessly, Russia has decided to tone down the rhetoric and get rid of the unwanted analogy between the future "gas OPEC" and the oil cartel.At the same time, Moscow has begun a project that could be an effective supplement to GECF, the International Alliance of Nongovernmental Natural Gas Organizations.
That name was first heard of at the end of 2006, from the Russian Natural Gas Society, the main lobbyist for Gazprom, headed by State Duma member Valery Yazev.
The IANNGO, in the conception of its organizers, would "create condition for the just distribution of income from the export of gas between producers and countries that transport gas, and form common investment sources for the development of the gas industry." The main difference between IANNGO and GECF is that the former will unite "nongovernmental gas organizations and leading gas companies of the countries producing and transporting natural gas," while the latter is an intergovernmental structure.The IANNGO project has been developing rapidly in recent years. At the beginning of April, the charter of the organization was presented to the parliamentary session of the Eurasian Economic Community.
Belarus already supports the Russian initiative, which is sufficient to register it. Kazakhstan is waiting and Uzbekistan is considering it.
"During the GECF in Moscow this June, we plan to present the IANNGO project as a platform for the settlement of problems among the gas business, consumers and the bodies of authority," Russian Natural Gas Society vice president Oleg Zhilin told Kommersant.
"We are frequently asked whether such states as Algeria, Qatar, Libya, Iran and Venezuela can become members of IANNGO.
The answer is unambiguous. They can. It is unimportant how developed their democratic institutions are."Opposition Libyan-StyleKommersant sources in government agencies were unwilling to predict which of the two competing draft GECF charters would be approved at the June forum, if they cannot be conciliated. There are abundant signs that the members of that organization have varying interests and differing expectations of it. For example, last week, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi stated at a lunch honoring Russian President Vladimir Putin that Tripoli supports "the idea of creating an organization of gas producing and exporting countries on the model of OPEC." Gaddafi also stated what he expected from the new organization. Its members "should help countries suffering from soaring oil prices, especially African countries."The likelihood of creating a natural gas analog to OPEC is viewed skeptically by experts. Vladimir Milov, president of the Institute for Energy Policy, explains that, in the next ten years, producers and consumers of natural gas will be linked by direct pipelines that, as a rule, will not intersect. "Qatar is the leading supplier to the United States and Great Britain, and Algeria to Spain and Italy. They cannot substitute each other's deliveries," Milov said. Moreover, according to Milov, competition is mounting for transit routes. "As soon as Russia announced South Stream, Iran said it was ready to become the resource base for Nabucco and began making bilateral contracts for gas delivery to the EU on the Transadriatic Gas Pipeline from Turkey to Greece and, eventually, to Italy," Milov noted. "The competitors cannot seriously be expected to conciliate routes between themselves."Milov thinks such associations are only "political dances and PR" without a united Political base. "Russia and Iran are not leaders within the gas forum. Qatar is friendly to the U.S. and will not make intrigues with Russian or Iranian sponsorship," he said. "In addition, Tehran, which preaches the Shia religion, is not trusted by the majority of Sunni gas exporting states in the Middle East. Russia, as a non-Muslim country, also has little trust in the region. Unlike them, Sunni Saudi Arabia is the political leader of the Middle East."Mikhail Korchemkin, director of the U.S. firm East European Gas Analysis thinks that the formation of a "gas OPEC" and cartel price control would push EU consumers to refuse natural gas and turn to alternative fuels. "Every announcement of reduced deliveries of gas to Ukraine or Belarus drive up demand for heating oil sharply in Europe," he explained. "I hope that the gas OPEC' will cause revolutionary changes in new sources of energy and the economy of energy usage." Korchemkin thinks that, in that case, natural gas will be left as only a raw material for petrochemistry and fertilizer, and fall in price, as coal did between the two world wars.
Natalia Grib, Andrey Odinets

http://www.kommersant.com/p884944/natural_gas_supplies/


Gas exporters to meet in Tehran on April 28

21:23 24/ 04/ 2008
MOSCOW, April 24 (RIA Novosti) - An alliance of the world's leading gas producers will hold a ministerial meeting in Tehran on April 28, the head of Russia's Gas Society said on Thursday.
"The Gas Exporting Countries Forum will hold a ministerial meeting in Iran's capital on April 28, where the charter of the so-called gas 'OPEC' will be discussed," Valery Yazev said.
He said there were two draft charters, a 'tough' one designed by Iran, and Russia's 'more delicate' version. Iran has proposed to regulate the functioning and principles of a gas equivalent of OPEC, while Russia's draft envisages fixing gas pricing mechanisms and gas transit routs.
"We should build an alliance of gas producers to formulate fair trading rules," Yazev said.
"Gas prices will not change, because they depend on the competitive situation with other energy prices," he said in an attempt to alleviate opponents' fears that a gas cartel will change radically the situation on the global markets.
The idea of establishing a gas OPEC was put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin and has always been supported by Iranian officials.
The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) first held a meeting in Tehran in 2001. The organization has not yet adopted a charter and lacks a strict membership system. However, it involves Venezuela, Iran, Libya, the UAE and Russia, and a number of other countries. Norway has the status of an observer.

other articles
19:59 14/04/2008 Iran and Russia need not fight for gas market
11:41 24/01/2008 'Gas OPEC' could be established in June - paper
17:24 13/04/2007 Gas cartel looking more attractive
12:14 11/04/2007 Will there be a gas OPEC?

http://en.rian.ru/business/20080424/105851967.html

The Roving Eye
Who profits from a gas OPEC?

by Asia TimesBy Pepe Escobar
Apr 11, 2007
DOHA and DAMASCUS -

Four years after the fall of Baghdad - which for the neo-cons would signal the advent of the US as "the new OPEC" - a meeting in the tiny Gulf emirate of Qatar may be signaling the birth of a new cartel: a "gas OPEC", grouping countries controlling 73% of the world's gas reserves and 42% of production. It's not as simple as it seems, because a gas cartel along the lines of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is above all a brilliant political idea - an astute exercise in (new) branding. The irony is that in this case the wealthy West - so keen on branding when it comes to soft drinks and TVs - has been shaken to the core.
Doha could not be a more adequate venue for this crucial meeting of the soon-to-be-rebranded Gas Exporting Countries Forum - an organization founded in 2001. By 2008, Qatar will be the world's premier supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG).
It already boasts the highest per capita income in the Middle East. Official spin rules that the emirate is "carefully investing" no less than US$130 billion over the next five to seven years to build a "dynamic and sustainable economy". Iraqis about to be "liberated" from their oil wealth have every reason to be jealous, not to mention the array of gas-deprived developing countries. Members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum include Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Norway is an observer.
The founding fathers of the gas OPEC would be Russia, Iran, Qatar, Venezuela and Algeria. All their political leaders are in favor - from Vladimir Putin to Mahmud Ahmadinejad, from Hugo Chavez to Abdelaziz Bouteflika. That's what sends shivers down the spines of the United States and the European Union - testy Putin and favorite bogeymen du jour Chavez and Ahmadinejad laying down the law in yet another powerful club. Russia holds the world's largest gas reserves (47.8 billion cubic meters), followed by Iran (26.7 billion cubic meters) and Qatar (23.7 billion cubic meters). But production is another matter. According to 2005 data, Russia controls no less than 21.6% of the world's natural-gas production, well ahead of Algeria (3.2%), Iran (3.1%), Indonesia (2.8%) and Malaysia (2.2%). Russia above all wants to become a huge global exporter: for the moment it exports only a third of its production. Iran, incredible as it might seem, imports more from Turkmenistan than it exports to Turkey - because of investment problems. Like Russia, Iran's aim is to become a major global exporter. No wonder Iran, with the world's second-largest gas reserves and desperately needing to export more, has vividly recommended to Russia the creation of a gas OPEC. Unlike the oil market, in gas matters there is no price coordination: prices are individually negotiated - for as long as five years per contract - between buyer and producer. Buyers - overwhelmingly from wealthy Western nations - usually have the upper hand. A gas OPEC makes total sense for producing countries in terms of a swift counterpunch to the West's economic might. As far as Iran is concerned, it's strategically fundamental: it would open the way for a much stronger presence in Asian and European markets, and it would improve its security and power of dissuasion. To cut to the chase: with Iran in a gas OPEC, no Western nation would dream of supporting a US preemptive strike. Easier said than done. Qatar may be in favor but as it is in fact little other than a US military base, Washington would never agree to its membership in a gas cartel. Moreover, Qatar already ships a lot of LNG to the US. Even before the meeting, Qatari Energy Minister Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah told Reuters in Abu Dhabi: "We do not see the need for the creation of a gas organization because the issue of gas is more complex." Turkmenistan's case, for that matter, is quite complex - as the Central Asia gas republic's natural wealth is actually exported through Russian pipelines. There's no inkling on the intentions of Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, the successor to the recently deceased Saparmurat Niyazov "Turkmenbashi", who reigned absolute-monarch-style for 21 years.
A Russian-Iranian game It is widely assumed that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei formally proposed the creation of a gas OPEC to the secretary of the Russian Security Council, Igor Ivanov, last January in Tehran. But the fact is, a gas OPEC has always been a Gazprom-nation initiative. It was not Iran, but Vladimir Putin himself - supported by the Central Asian republics - who first came up with the idea of a gas OPEC, way back in 2002. Obviously all major Western corporations were against it.
Lately, Putin has been much more cautious. In his annual Kremlin press conference on February 1, he said on the record that he did not want to see a gas OPEC controlling production to influence gas prices; he was more interested in "cooperation" to help the security of supplies. This happened after May 2006, when Gazprom deputy chairman Aleksandr Medvedev had thrown a news bomb, saying that if Russia didn't get a good energy deal with the European Union it would create "an alliance of gas suppliers more influential than OPEC".

In August, this "alliance of gas suppliers" was already in business - as Gazprom and Algeria's Sonatrach signed a memorandum of understanding calling for coordinated gas prices. It's practically inevitable that Gazprom and Sonatrach will market their gas together in Europe - and that certainly opens the way to a gas OPEC. What EU officials who keep complaining about the "lack of transparency" of Russia's gas strategy really wanted was to see Sonatrach involved in a price war with Gazprom, so in the end the Europeans would dictate their own conditions. Wishful thinking: this is not going to happen. The Nezavissimaya Gazeta daily argues, "More than 57% of the world's gas reserves are concentrated in three countries - Russia, Iran and Qatar. If these states create a cartel, the gas OPEC will be easier to manage than the oil cartel and may in fact have the monopoly on the sector." If that is the case, one should expect an inflation of Putin voodoo dolls. The key reason Putin and the Gazprom nation are so demonized among Western financial/corporate elites is simple. It's called direct marketing - which happens to be yet one more Western concept. Putin does not give a damn about Wall Street or the City of London. He does not give a damn about the US dollar, either (he prefers selling in euros). And he prefers to sell the Gazprom nation's gas contract by contract, and company by company. Russia and Iran united in a gas OPEC royally serves them both. Iran's export way out is first and foremost Asia. Russia wants to concentrate on Europe. But the Europeans would do anything to diversify their sources, so Iran, in the end, will also be the winner. Russian newspaper Vremia Novostiei argues that "an agreement for the formation of a gas OPEC would mean the unequivocal passage of Russia from the status of partner of the West to opposing it, and not only from the point of view of energy". It's not that simple. It would all depend on a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear dossier - which is in the interests of the gas-hungry European Union. Diplomats in Brussels never stop swearing that the EU's ultimate fear is to become a hostage to Russia's energy policy. The alternative supplier is definitely Iran. One thing is certain. Doha signals to the world that the Gas Exporting Countries Forum is no longer a talking shop: now it really means business. "Gas OPEC", as a branding concept, is here to stay. It does not matter that Canada, Norway, the Netherlands and Australia - which combined sell 35% of the gas available in world markets - are not part of it. The idea has been planted - and in this case the idea is far more influential than concrete mechanisms to implement it. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, true to form, had to react with extreme paranoia. Last November, NATO members were "warned" that Russia was fabricating a new, deadly political roadside bomb against Europe, by trying to set up a natural-gas cartel from Algeria to Central Asia. Welcome to the new, Pentagon-inspired, arc of (gas) instability. Who would have thought that branding could become so explosive? Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007). He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com. (Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

http://209.85.129.104/search?q=cache:sYutQ6fIArsJ:www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/ID11Dj01.html+gas+opec&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=ro

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Russia to Propose Gas OPEC Charter

22 April 2008The Moscow TimesRussian proposals to create a "gas OPEC" will come under scrutiny at a meeting of officials from gas-producing countries in Tehran next week, Kommersant reported Monday.Russia wants 15 member states of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum to adopt a charter that will allow them to hammer out a universal pricing formula, coordinate construction of new pipelines and use spot deliveries to compensate for possible shortfalls in long-term supply contracts, the report said, citing a government source. Russia's draft charter is less stringent than a proposal by Iran, Kommersant said.Energy officials representing member countries will meet in Tehran on April 28, the paper said. Ministers from those countries will meet in Moscow in June, it said.Gazprom and the Industry and Energy Ministry drew up the proposals, Kommersant said.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1009/42/362200.htm


'Gas OPEC' could be established in June - paper

11:41 24/ 01/ 2008
MOSCOW, January 24 (RIA Novosti) - Russia and other major natural gas exporters could announce a cartel similar to OPEC in Moscow in June, a Russian business daily said on Thursday.
Kommersant said, however, citing analysts, that even if the gas cartel was formed it would be unlikely to immediately achieve a comparable level of global influence to that enjoyed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in the oil business due to U.S. and EU opposition.
Members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, which control 73% of the world's gas reserves and 42% of production, held a session in Egypt on Wednesday and plan to discuss a charter of the new international organization based on the principles guiding OPEC at its next session in June, the daily said.
The draft charter was proposed last year by Iran, which has the world's second largest gas reserves and is in need of new export markets, the paper said.
Unlike the oil market, there is currently no price coordination in gas dealings. Prices are individually negotiated for five years per contract between producers and consumers. Membership in a gas cartel would give exporters greater clout and a stronger presence on Asian and European markets.
Russia's Industry and Energy Ministry made changes to the draft charter and submitted it for coordination with other ministries in November after a GECF session in Doha, Qatar, in late October. The Foreign Ministry and Economic Development and Trade Ministry have criticized Iran's draft over negative political consequences it could trigger, the paper said, citing government sources.
Gas producers plan to finally coordinate their positions on the charter in Moscow, which experts quoted by Kommersant warn could trigger fresh tensions in relations between Russia and the United States.
Washington has labeled the brainchild of some of the world's least democratic countries as a security threat and said it was designed for "extortion". The founding fathers of the 'gas OPEC' would be Russia, Iran, Qatar, Venezuela and Algeria.
An analyst with the Troika Dialog investment said an organization of gas exporting states would be created in the next few years, but it would have no major influence on the market due to fierce opposition from the U.S. and Europe.
"The exporters will have to take an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary, way to the gradual consolidation of efforts," Valery Nesterov told the newspaper.
A senior Russian Industry and Energy official told Kommersant it was not clear whether the emergence of the cartel would be announced at the Moscow forum.
"Talks on a new gas pricing policy have been conducted and producers' and consumers' demands have been coordinated, and recommendations on investment in the gas industry have been discussed," Stanislav Naumov admitted, adding that this did not mean that Iran's proposal enjoyed unequivocal backing.
Russia's gas giant Gazprom has given no official comments on the Iranian initiative, Kommersant said.
The Gas Exporting Countries Forum was set up in 2001. It has no charter, clear membership structure or representation in any country. Its permanent participants include Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Norway is an observer.

19:59 14/04/2008 Iran and Russia need not fight for gas market
11:41 24/01/2008 'Gas OPEC' could be established in June - paper
17:24 13/04/2007 Gas cartel looking more attractive
12:14 11/04/2007 Will there be a gas OPEC?

http://en.rian.ru/business/20080424/105851967.html


Iran and Russia need not fight for gas market
19:59 14/ 04/ 2008

MOSCOW. (Igor Tomberg for RIA Novosti) - Iran has stepped up its diplomatic activity, suggesting that its conflict with the West over its nuclear program is losing momentum, and the use of military force to settle it is no longer the only option.
Americans, who are preparing for presidential elections, are more concerned about Iraq and the mortgage crisis.
But when analyzing the situation from the Russian perspective, we should remember that Iran has added energy to the quiver of its military and political arrows. Its advance to the global gas market could disrupt the current balance of interests there.
Iran is the world's fourth largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait, and has the second largest gas reserves after Russia.
In the past few years, a combination of international sanctions and internal technical and political problems have hindered both gas production and development of Iran's energy sector. But surging gas prices have spurred foreign interest in Iranian reserves. Tehran has been pursuing a more energetic gas policy, indicating its readiness to cooperate with the European Union, which, eager to diversify its gas supplies, is increasingly willing to separate political from economic questions in relations with Iran.
Portugal has been negotiating with Iran since 2006. Italy's Edison is discussing supplying Iranian gas to Italy. In mid-March, the Swiss electricity group EGL signed a 25-year contract with the National Iran Gas Export Company (NIGEC) on gas supplies worth $20 billion. Soon after that, Austria's EconGas GmbH signed an agreement on gas deliveries from Iran beginning in 2013.
The Nabucco project, which Europe and the United States view as the main prong in the drive to diversify gas deliveries to the EU, was initially designed to pump gas from Iran's Caspian coast to Europe, bypassing Russia.
Austrian energy concern OMV planned to develop the South Pars gas field in Iran, the largest in the world (with 3,500 trillion cu m, or 123.55 trillion cu f), for the Nabucco pipeline. But it shifted its focus to Azerbaijan when relations between Iran and the United States deteriorated.
Azerbaijan, however, does not have enough gas for the pipeline, which needs at least 30 billion cu m (1.06 trillion cu f) per year to be profitable.
The success of a Russian diplomatic offensive in the Balkans in late February seems finally to have buried the project. Russian officials signed agreements with Bulgaria and Serbia on building a rival pipeline, South Stream, to pump Central Asian gas to Europe.
But the initiators of the Nabucco project have continued to search for alternative gas sources, in particular in Iran.
Aware of its critical importance for Nabucco, Tehran has become more active on the gas market. Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mattaki said during his visit to Bulgaria shortly after Russia and Bulgaria signed the South Stream contract that Iran's involvement in Nabucco was "a possible sphere of cooperation with the EU."
However, Iran would not like Russia to view this as a challenge to its energy strategy in southern Europe. "My words regarding the Nabucco gas pipeline are not spearheaded against a third country," Mattaki added.
Is this so?
Iran's advance to the European gas market and its plans to develop its gas reserves could well disrupt the balance of interests on the market, which European consumers question anyway.
Coupled with U.S. plans for developing Iraqi gas reserves, Iranian gas could provide the requisite supply for the Nabucco project. This may be hypothetical at the moment, but the mere existence of potential gas reserves for the pipeline may encourage Russia to step up the South Stream project.
Iran's contract to deliver gas to Switzerland stipulates the early commissioning of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), a joint project between EGL and Norway's StatoilHydro. In other words, Iranian gas could be delivered to two export pipelines running to Europe: Nabucco and TAP.
This can be interpreted as the struggle for the vast - some say inexhaustible -European gas market. It is true that Europe needs increasing amounts of gas, but it is also working hard and spending mind-boggling sums in an effort to level off its energy balance, cut the share of hydrocarbons in it, and introduce energy-saving technologies. In 10 to 15 years, these efforts and expenses may lead to a drop in gas consumption.
Competition on the gas market will soon affect prices. This group of risks has come to the fore after Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan announced their decision to convert to European gas prices in their contracts with Gazprom. The Russian gas monopoly accepted their prices, although this will inhibit its room for maneuver in the upcoming struggle for gas markets.
Meanwhile, Iran is playing on the EU's desire to ease its dependence on Russia and save money. NIGEC's 25-year contract with Swiss EGL has been assessed at 10-22 billion euros, or 90-200 euros per 1,000 cubic meters (35,300 cu f) of gas. Gazprom sells its gas to Europe at 240 euros and may increase the price to 260 euros by the end of the year.
So far, Iran does not have enough gas to pose a serious threat to Gazprom's position in Europe. The Russian company satisfies as much as 30% of European gas demand (about 150-160 billion cu m, or 5.65 trillion cu f, annually). Considering the combined capacity of Nabucco (31 billion cu m, or 1.09 trillion cu f) and TAP (10-20 billion cu m, or 353-706 billion cu f) and the projects' deadline set for 2012-2013, they are unlikely to radically change the situation on the gas market, although time will be a crucial factor.
On the other hand, signs of improvement in relations with Iran do not mean that the United States has no complaints to Iran. Likewise, Europe has no freedom of choice in the matter, because Washington insists that the Iranian-Swiss gas supply contract be scrutinized for compliance with the provisions of sanctions against Iran. Geneva and other European capitals surely know what this warning means.
This points to one more possible scenario, beneficial to Gazprom: Iran may reroute its gas supplies to China, Pakistan and India. Why should it wait for the United States to change its attitude when there are potential clients in the east with huge energy requirements, who will not be swayed by Washington?
Indian Oil Minister Murli Deora has recently said the country wants Iran to build a gas pipeline to India and plans to resume talks with Pakistan on the natural gas pipeline from Iran. The United States is reportedly against that project, but India intends to ignore its objections.
Iran and Russia should probably not compete against each other but join hands on the gas market. The Iranian president has more than once suggested to his Russian colleague that their countries coordinate their gas policies and possibly divide gas markets. Moreover, there could be an agreement under which Russia will continue to supply gas to Europe, while Iran will export its gas to the east. This would undermine plans to diversify supply to Europe, which heavily depends on the United States.
There is growing evidence of plans to form a gas cartel, not unlike OPEC, at the 7th Ministerial Meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Moscow this summer. Iran has drafted the charter of the new organization. Its approval would formalize the many semiformal cartel-type agreements that have allegedly been signed.
Igor Tomberg, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow at the Center for Energy Studies, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080414/105045260.html


What I Say, Not What I Do

// The price of the question
Russia has had intentions of forming a natural gas OPEC for several years now. Many attribute the idea to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who, seeing the success of the oil OPEC, was inspired to crease its gas sister. Tehran's plan, which saw the light of day in 2001, was not initially of great interest in Russia. But that changed in a few years. A reform of the natural gas market began in Europe, where Gazprom and the Russian federal budget along with it, derived a significant share of its income. The Europeans for some reasons adamantly refused to let Gazprom at the final consumer and demanded to dismember the monopoly into parts.
That was when Moscow recollected the Iranian ayatollah's idea. A gas OPEC became a symbol the Russian gas industry used to intimidate its uncooperative European partners even as Russian authorities officially disowned all such plans. In 2006, for example, Valery Yazev, main Gazprom lobbyist in the State Duma, threatened that the new gas organization would be more effective and influential than OPEC. At the very same time, Arkady Dvorkovich, head of the expert department of the Russian presidential executive staff, gave assurances that the Kremlin was not going to form any gas OPEC.Meanwhile, relations between Gazprom and the European Union deteriorated sharply and the boogeyman began to take on visible form. At the beginning of last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly supported the idea of an international gas cartel while speaking with the Emir of Qatar. Then Russia got busy with preparations for the forum of gas exporting countries in Doha and even became host of the next forum. Only the most impressionable of American congressmen were frightened by these threats. No one made any serious concessions to Gazprom, even though gas prices rose.Now history has gone so far that Gazprom and the Russian government are writing the charter for a new organization in an urgent rush. The date of the Moscow forum is approaching fast and it is time to have potential projects ready. The most serious problems come up here. Moscow cannot answer the main question – Is the project commercial or political?It is not clear how the new organization can be used to settle economic issues. The main participants in the forum are the current or future competitors with Gazprom in a number of issues – pipeline routes, division of the market for liquefied natural gas, and so on. The formation of a gas OPEC is unlikely to bring political benefits. No one argues the fact that Gazprom has become an important player on the diplomatic field. They await the pronouncements of Gazprom official spokesman Sergey Kupriyanov in Kiev and Tbilisi with as much or more seriousness as they listen to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The level of relations with Ukraine, Georgia and the EU allows us evaluate the effectiveness of "gas diplomacy." Paradoxically, it seems that Russia has the power to ruin the Moscow forum, for only rumors f a gas OPEC are in its interest, not a real organization.
Alexander Gabuev
All the Article in Russian as of Apr. 21, 2008
http://www.kommersant.com/p884923/r_520/gas_supplies/


Gas cartel looking more attractive
17:24 13/ 04/ 2007

MOSCOW. (Dr. Sergei Kolchin for RIA Novosti) - The sixth Gas Exporting Countries' Forum, which recently ended in Doha, the capital of Qatar, attracted much more attention than previous meetings.
Before it started, there had been numerous signals that a gas analog of OPEC might be set up.
Contrary to expectations, such an organization did not emerge. But the meeting has nevertheless shown that gas exporting countries are gradually realizing the need for coordinated action instead of mere declarations of cooperation.
Iran was the first to stir up trouble, announcing a proposal for "a gas OPEC" at the end of last year. As with any initiative coming from this most eccentric player on the international stage, it naturally caused a nervous response from the United States and the European Union, which saw the future cartel as an attempt to pressure and blackmail gas consuming countries.
The reaction of other leading exporters - Russia, Qatar, Algeria and Central Asian countries - was cautious at first. This is easy to understand. Until Russia completes the North European Gas Pipeline, which will pump gas directly to Germany, and establishes its own liquefied natural gas facilities, it will remain dependent on transit countries for gas exports. At the same time, it is a transit country for Central Asian gas going to Europe. Given such circumstances, it is difficult to discuss a coordinated pricing policy following the OPEC model.
However, further developments showed that gas exporting countries, despite political and other differences in their development priorities, did not want to reject the possibility of an international gas alliance altogether, at least out of pragmatic economic considerations. So the forum in Doha was intended to resolve a complicated and controversial problem. On the one hand, it was necessary to reassure gas consumers, so forum participants repeatedly emphasized that no analog of OPEC was yet on the table and that none of them was determined to set it up. On the other hand, they recognized the need for mechanisms to coordinate their interests, even if through bilateral and multilateral consultations instead of within a united organization. Time will tell whether the Doha forum has succeeded in this, but some outlines of a coordinated policy of gas exporters can already be seen. They were laid out in documents signed at the forum. The major gas exporting countries, therefore, now have closer positions on creating a gas cartel.
Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko, who headed the Russian delegation at the forum, said that Russia could undertake to draw up regulations and even finance preparations for setting up the cartel. It is no coincidence that the next meeting of gas producing countries will take place in Moscow.
Qatar has also softened its position as regards the gas alliance. In Doha, Russia and Qatar decided to set up a bilateral committee to coordinate the moves of Gazprom and Qatar Petroleum on foreign markets. Prior to the Doha forum, Gazprom held negotiations on the matter in Algeria. The idea of a gas OPEC is winning supporters in Latin America as well, namely, Venezuela and Bolivia.
It is clear that gas exporters are waking up to the need for coordination, especially in their pricing policies. As a result, the forum decided to set up a group to discuss gas prices. International experts believe that the group will most probably try to determine a new way to set prices, eliminating the current gas prices' dependence on oil prices, but it will not regulate prices as toughly as OPEC does.
So the decision is not viewed as a step toward a gas cartel. Coordinating their policies, however, may help exporters unpeg gas prices from prices for crude oil and petrochemicals, which is important for their economic prospects. It will also help them cooperate as equals with the consumers' cartel represented by the International Energy Agency, which makes setting up a producers' cartel more relevant.
An important achievement of the Doha forum was to set up a coordination committee of energy ministers, led by Russia, that would "address the forum's development."
So here are the key results of the forum in Qatar:
Gas exporting countries are realizing the need for coordinated action, which earlier boiled down to nothing more than empty declarations. Moreover, it seems quite possible that energy prices will fall over the next 10-15 years, resulting in losses for gas exporters.
Political sympathies and priorities are giving way to sober economic pragmatism; hence Russia's closer relations in the gas sector with Qatar and Iran.
Russia is regaining its traditional dominant role in the global gas alliance (it controls over 25% of the world's gas reserves), especially as pressure from the West mounts. But it will be difficult to maintain that role because it depends on supplying gas along previously created routes and because of strained relations with some ex-Soviet countries.
Under these circumstances, the setup of a gas OPEC looks like a remote prospect. However, the positions of gas exporting countries are getting closer and they already have common views, especially on coordinated pricing policies.
Although a gas cartel did not emerge in Doha, preparations for one did begin. Some international experts estimate that the share of gas in the energy balance will grow, which will increase gas exporters' importance for the global economy. Russia can play a special part here, and it is interested in close contacts with other leading gas exporters. The process of moving closer together is already under way.
Dr. Sergei Kolchin is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Economics, the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070413/63609379.html


-----------------------------
Will there be a gas OPEC?
12:14 11/ 04/ 2007

MOSCOW. (Igor Tomberg for RIA Novosti) - The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) has just finished its work in Qatar's capital Doha. Russia was represented by a high-ranking delegation headed by Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko and Gazprom CEO Alexander Miller.
Participants in the forum discussed coordination of gas production and supplies. The main intrigue was the prospect of forming an OPEC-style gas cartel.
The very first day of the forum made it clear that active work on setting up a gas cartel was underway although no documents to this effect were going to be signed. After the forum, Khristenko said that participants in the meeting have decided to establish a high-profile group to deal with gas prices. Although gas exporters have not yet gone for a cartel, their agreement to control and coordinate price formation is a step towards OPEC's gas counterpart.
The GECF nations will take their next step to the cartel on Russian territory. They will meet for their seventh forum in Moscow in 2008. Khristenko said the forum made this decision at Russia's proposal. He noted that Russia will coordinate a high-profile price-forming group. This means that Russia will lead gas exporters to unity, and this is only fair considering that it can add geopolitical weight to the future alliance.
The idea of a gas OPEC has dominated the politicized debates on global energy problems, all the more so after President Vladimir Putin said during his first visit to Qatar in February 2007: "Whether we need it and whether we will build it, is a separate subject, but gas producers must coordinate their actions." Later on, the leaders of all major gas producers that possess 70% of its world reserves supported this idea in different forms.
Response of consumers, primarily the United States and Western Europe is predictably negative. In early April, the House of the U.S. Congress asked Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. "The creation of this cartel would pose a major and long-term threat to the world's energy supply," said Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. "We must vigorously oppose the establishment of this global extortion and racket."
Europe is particularly worried about the plan to set up a cartel. This is only natural - in the estimate of leading research centers, gas consumption will be going up in long-term perspective. The latest forecasts predict that by 2020, gas consumption in Europe may approximate 640 billion cubic meters. At the same time, there is an obvious trend to reduce domestic production, which will make Europe even more dependent on imports. In the cautious estimate of E.ON Ruhrgas that has studied then already signed contracts, by 2020 the European Union may be short of 140 billion cubic meters of gas.
But it would not be entirely correct to reduce the whole problem to higher gas prices. Many European and other experts deny the link between the would-be union of gas suppliers and price hikes. First, most gas supplies in the world are carried out under long-term contracts where prices on gas are tied to oil quotations. Second, an increase in gas prices may hit back the exporters because many consumers will find it cheaper to switch to coal or renewable energy sources, or develop nuclear energy.
Paradoxically as it may seem, but Brussels also needs a threat like a gas OPEC - it is a good argument to strengthen the EU united front in gas dialogue with Russia. Khristenko noted that "the reasons for concern of the gas consumers and their sharp criticism should be sought within these countries." In his opinion, "it is very easy to present gas exporters as a monster and create an image of a global threat in order to distract attention from one's own problems. This is a routine political trick."
Russia that actually guarantees the advance of gas exporters to unity needs a gas OPEC as an instrument of establishing rules of a game that would meet the interests of both producers and consumers. The world's leader in gas production, exports and reserves, Moscow wants to have an opportunity to influence the policy of all major gas producers and, in perspective, transit countries rather than the attributes of a formal institution.
Indicatively, the louder the appeals for a gas OPEC, the fewer demands that Russia should ratify the Energy Charter. The tactic of sidetracking attention works. For Moscow, entry into a coordination cartel is a much less binding step than ratification of the Charter with all of its indigestible protocols. If the leading gas exporters reach some agreements of principle, the rules of the game will undergo a dramatic change.
Strategically, it is important for Russia not to overdo with the talk about a gas cartel. The emergence of an influential union of gas producers may seriously upset the balance of forces and interests, and become a reason for major conflicts and confrontation between energy producers and consumers.
It is quite obvious that Iran and Venezuela that do not feature prominently in the gas market were trying to draw Moscow into unnecessary political games. Russia resisted these efforts and continued active contacts with Algeria and Qatar at the forum. Russian gas producers need to coordinate actions with these leading gas suppliers.
Experts agree that concerted policy will help to untie gas prices from oil quotations. All producers and exporters of gas have a stake in this because if they succeed, they will be able to conduct their own price policy without looking at the situation in the oil market.
An alliance of gas exporters will allow them to cooperate on an equal footing with the consumer cartel represented by the International Energy Agency. However, to guarantee energy security in full measure, producers will have to include transit countries in the cartel, because they can keep supplies from getting to consumers.
To sum up, the formation of a cartel has been postponed. But the idea is alive and its major aspect - gas price - is being translated into reality. This is an important step toward stronger unity of competing gas producers.
Igor Tomberg, Ph.D. (economics), is senior research fellow with the Center for Energy Studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070411/63456401.html

Moscow drafts softer charter for gas cartel

Russia will present its draft charter of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which it wants to become a gas OPEC, at an April 28 meeting in Tehran.
Unlike Iran's draft modeled on the charter of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the charter elaborated in Moscow presents GECF as the international floor for elaborating the gas price formula and discussing new gas routes.
Experts say it will be very difficult for potential gas cartel members to agree with each other.
Russia's Gazprom and Economic Development and Trade Ministry say GECF is quite unlike OPEC.
"We don't need a cartel agreement," they said.
Moscow advanced its current initiative in response to the Iranian vision of the forum's future presented in December last year. According to sources in the Russian government and Gazprom, the Iranian draft is very similar to the OPEC charter. Several Russian ministries that have analyzed it have rejected the document as unacceptable.
The newspaper's sources in government agencies cannot say which of the two drafts will be approved at the GECF meeting in Moscow in June. The potential members of the gas OPEC have widely different interests and expectations.
Tripoli supports the idea of an organization of gas exporting countries similar to OPEC, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi said at a party organized in honor of Russian President Vladimir Putin last week.
He said that the new organization should help countries hit by skyrocketing oil prices, above all in Africa.
Experts are wary of the idea of a gas OPEC. Vladimir Milov, president of the independent Moscow-based Institute of Energy Policy, said that in the next ten years gas suppliers would be linked with gas consumers with direct pipelines, very few of which cross.
"Qatar is the largest [gas] supplier to the United States and Britain, while Algeria mostly delivers its gas to Spain and Italy, and there is no way they can exchange their clients," Milov said.
Besides, there is growing competition in gas routes.
"As soon as Russia announced its South Stream project [designed to pump Central Asian natural gas to Europe], Iran said it could supply gas for the Nabucco pipeline [bypassing Russia] and started signing bilateral agreements on gas supplies to the European Union via the trans-Adriatic gas pipeline from Turkey to Greece and later possibly to Italy."
According to Milov, "one cannot expect rivals to coordinate their delivery routes."
Vedomosti, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Iran set to sign oil and gas cooperation deal with Gazprom
17:42 22/ 04/ 2008
TEHRAN, April 22 (RIA Novosti) - Tehran expects to sign an oil and gas cooperation agreement with Russian energy giant Gazprom in the near future, the republic's oil minister, Gholam-Hossein Nozari, said on Tuesday.
Nozari said negotiations were currently under way with Gazprom to develop several sites at the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf and the North Azadegan oil deposit in the country's south.
"We hope these negotiations will be successfully concluded in the near future," Nozari said.
Gazprom has been participating in the development of the South Pars field's second and third stages together with France's TotalElf and Malaysia's Petronas. The facility is operating in design mode to produce and process 20 billion cu m of gas annually.
Iran's proven natural gas reserves total over 28 trillion cubic meters. In 2006, gas production in the republic was 105 billion cu m, with consumption standing at 105.1 billion cu m. Gas accounts for 53% of the country's energy balance, oil 44%, the hydropower industry 2% and coal 1%.
South Pars holds 60% of Iran's reserves, and 10% of known global reserves of natural gas. The deposit is a part of the North Dome deposit, the largest non-associated gas field in the world, situated in Qatar and Iran.
The North Azadegan field has reserves of about 33 billion barrels of crude.

http://en.rian.ru/world/20080422/105631838.html


Gazprom moves to Africa to attack southern Europe

Gazprom and Libya's National Oil Corporation have signed a cooperation memorandum and discussed some joint projects. Implementation of the gas monopoly's plans will strengthen its standing not only in Africa but also in southern Europe.
Libya promised Russia not only resource-related but also political support on the world energy market. At a lunch given in honor of Vladimir Putin, the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi said Libya welcomed the idea of giving legal shape to a new organization of gas exporting countries based on OPEC. Gazprom plans to join the Green Stream project (50% owned by Italy's Eni), which is to link Africa and Europe (from Libya to Sicily), and is considering the option of a gas pipeline to run in parallel.
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said Eni was taking part in the development of a very large oil and gas field in Libya. "With the asset swapping agreements Gazprom has with Eni, we expect to share in these projects," he said.
Mikhail Korchemkin, director of East European Gas Analysis, said that Gazprom's segment of global gas output would fall from 19% in 2007 to 13% in 2030. "Gazprom can keep its influence on world markets only by selling gas produced in other countries," he said. "Libya is therefore interesting to it not only as a tappable resource, but perhaps also as a transit country for the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline from Nigeria, which has more proven reserves than Turkmenistan."
Analysts say that the agreements Gazprom reached in Libya could set the European community seriously agog, worried as it is by Gazprom's growing international stance. "Gazprom's participation in the Libyan gas projects will enable it to enter south European markets, where its holding is as yet weak," said Tamara Kasyanova, director general of the independent consulting group 2K Audit - Business Consulting.
"Gazprom is serially concluding agreements with all energy suppliers to Europe. This enables it to coordinate exporters' interests and increase the country's impact on the gas market in Europe," said Timur Khairullin, a senior analyst with the AntantaPioglobal investment company.
Eni is likely to act as a guide for the Russian monopoly, pointing the way to Europe. The company that played no small role in stripping the bankrupt Yukos company expects to get some appetizing assets in Russia. In exchange, it is prepared to share with Gazprom everything it has.
RBC Daily

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080418/105435653.html

Iran again in the spotlight

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Whether in the end Iran will be sacrificed to fuel countries hostile to Russia, such as Romania (in exchange for a degree of Russia's rapprochment towards Europe), or not, Putin has no intentions to leave Iran from his nuclear hands.

Putin seems to have proposed to Bush once again the Iran-European scheme, but Putin presented to Bush also the variant when the US will again reject his proposals.

In this case Iran will turn its back to Europe and will go for China and India.

But, in order to achieve any of the above-mentioned plans, Putin must have the Russian nuclear facilities in Iran secured officially.

So, if anything, Russia seems keen to gain its legal nuclear ownership of Iran.

Putin has lost enough in Europe. Does he intend to ever regain what he lost there? This is another good question.

If Iran will fuel at some point countries hostile to Russia, he might demand in return the turn to the left of some European states.

The talks with Bush seem to go in circles. Since the talks on Iran resumed, it's possible that the talks on Europe resumed as well.

Putin might've never really dropped his European plan.

How he will eventually try to restore it, it's not easy to say, but since Nabucco and other pipelines which are now in the mere project stage will be functional in years from now on, a long term plan might've been discussed also for Europe, at the last Putin-Bush meeting in Sochi.

See the interesting articles related to the topic:

~Vera

Iran and Russia need not fight for gas market

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080414/105045260.html

Is Iran a nuclear power?

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080416/105251460.html

IAEA deputy chief discusses Iran's nuclear program

"The IAEA said in a report released in late February that Iran had become more transparent on its nuclear program, but had failed to fully answer allegations relating to nuclear weapons development".

http://en.rian.ru/world/20080421/105553284.html

=========================================

The Battle for the Arctic Resumes

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SEE ALSO MY PREVIOUS ARTICLES:

- The Dark side of the Arctic Mission
- Will the US sign the Law of the Sea Convention?

at the link:

http://putinfreakshow.blogspot.com/2007_08_01_archive.html

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The Arctic nations (with territories North of the Arctic circle) are Russia, Canada, Denmark, the US, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. The first three countries (Russia, Canada and Denmark) possess significant territories extending northwards of the Arctic circle. (see map).



Despite the recent claims posted in the international media, Arctic is a purely military region, where Putin announced Russia's military counteroffensive against the US, as a result of the failed dipomatic talks with Bush Sr. in Kennebunkport, which brought to Putin's knowledge that Bush Sr. is serious and firm about his intentions of planting American Patriot rackets pointed against Russia in Poland and a sophisticated radar meant to follow every Russian move, in the Czech Republic.



RIA Novosti announced on 10.04.2008 that the Nordic countries involved in the partition of the Arctic region, reopened the talks in Riksgransen, Sweden, on April 8 and 9 at the so-called "Nordic Globalization Forum hosted by the US-backed right wong Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt.

The forum hosted the prime ministers of Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Finland.

With Denmark a staunch supporter of the US' military operations in Iraq, with Iceland practically a British colony, with Canada - the US' brother and with Sweden led by a right-wing (US-backed coalition), of all the above-mentioned countries only Finland is somewhat loyal to Russia and hence eventually disposed to make its Arctic territories available for a Russian military exploitation.

The rest, including Sweden, led by a right-wing coalition which militates for Sweden's integration in NATO, is against Russia in its attempts to regain its Arctic territories.

The arctic region is very important for Russia, military speaking, because Russia needs to boost its capacity of hitting the United States.

The North Pole is an ideal place of pointing Russian rackets against the US, both because of the location in itself, because of the superiority of the Russian submarines located there for very long and also because of the harsh weather conditions that Russians bear better than Americans, being used to that severe climate and which could make them eventually win a military confrontation there.



~Vera

RELATED ARTICLES:

Nordic countries outline their Arctic interests
15:55

10/ 04/ 2008

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) - The prime ministers of Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Finland met in Riksgransen, Sweden, on April 8 and 9 for the Nordic Globalization Forum hosted by Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt.

They also coordinated their interests and put forth their views on Arctic problems.

The meeting was attended by the heads of Scandinavia's leading industrial and energy companies, trade unions, newspaper publishers, politicians, and globalization, climate and energy experts. It was not just a friendly get-together, although the summit was not expected to make any formal decisions.

Its focal point was the prime ministers' excursion to Riksgransen Mountain, which gave the name to the city, reputed as the northernmost ski resort in the world, 350 km (218 miles) north of the Arctic Circle.

Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, Danish leader Anders Rasmussen, Iceland's Prime Minister Geir Haarde, Norway's Jens Stoltenberg and Finland's Matti Vanhanen were part of the daring excursion.

The subject of the meeting in Riksgransen was "A competitive Nordic region in a globalized world," or rather challenges of economic development, climate change and energy. The Arctic theme sounded quite loudly at the summit, with the climate, energy, globalization and Arctic experts gathered to encourage the Nordic leaders and Nordic cooperation to move in the right direction.

This was bound to happen, taking into account recent moves made by strong players such as Russia, Canada and the United States in and around the Arctic. However, while these three players are at loggerheads with each other over the region, the Scandinavian countries seem ready to act jointly, which they are likely to do better than other countries, considering their forays into other territories in past centuries and their experience in developing northern reserves.

The Arctic countries were stirred by Russia's August 2007 expedition, which placed the Russian flag on the seabed of the Arctic Ocean.

This infuriated Peter MacKay, then the foreign minister of Canada, who said: "Look, this isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory.' Our claims over our Arctic are very well-established."

MacKay said there was no threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, despite the latest claims by Russia.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov retorted that Russia was not just placing flags, but doing what trailblazers always do.

Canada knew what it was all about by that time. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has made four visits beyond the Arctic Circle since then, and Canada has pledged to allocate tens of millions of dollars for the construction of a deepwater port and naval base at Nanisivik, is expanding the army training center in Resolute Bay, has earmarked $7.5 billion for building several Arctic patrol vessels to protect its sovereignty, and will increase the group of 100 servicemen to 1,000 in the Arctic.

The United States is also increasing its presence in the region, and its ocean surveillance ships make regular visits there.

Canadians claim that Russia is trying to steal 460,000 square miles of seabed, an area five times larger than Britain, in the Arctic. But it was Canada who started trouble in the Arctic in the 1950s by proclaiming its sovereignty over the North Pole. The International Court of Justice ruled then that the territory would be proclaimed Canadian property, unless some other country proved during 100 years that it owns the seabed of the Arctic Ocean. This started the race.

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, a multi-disciplinary science organization that focuses on biology, geography, geology, geospatial information and water, more than 25% of undiscovered oil and gas reserves could be under the Arctic shelf. Compared with them, the total reserves of Saudi Arabia, the world's largest net oil exporter, look like a keg of beer next to an Olympic swimming pool.

Besides, the world's climate is getting warmer, and the Arctic is thawing faster than any other region in the world. In 10 or 15 years, or possibly even sooner, the Northwest Passage off Canada, the shortest route from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean halving the travel time from Japan to Europe, might become navigable throughout the year.

It is therefore not surprising that the world has become addicted to "geographical discoveries" and the Arctic nations are marking "their" territory.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080410/104750414.html


Debating NATO: Sweden and Finland keep their distance

http://www.thelocal.se/11020/20080410/

Published: 10 Apr 08 12:32 CETOnline: http://www.thelocal.se/11020/
Sweden and Finland have become more willing to debate possible NATO membership, writes Tallinn-based journalist Justin Petrone. But opposition to the alliance remains strong.

Despite the continued dominance in Sweden and Finland of a solid majority opposed to future inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the public debate about joining the alliance has grown less controversial in recent years, several experts say.

However, they also emphasize that both countries are still a long way from joining the alliance.According to Pål Jonson, vice president of the Swedish Atlantic Council, Tomas Ries, director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Risto Pentillä, director of the Finnish Business and Policy Forum, there are various reasons for the recent warming in the domestic debates within both Sweden and Finland.

These new factors include the election of Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt’s centre-right government in October 2006; the accession of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the alliance in 2004; as well as the influence of highly globalized business communities and political elites in both countries.

Jonson, Ries, and Pentillä described the current Finnish and Swedish discourse on NATO during a panel discussion at the second annual Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn two weeks ago.

The conference was hosted by the International Center for Defense Studies, a foreign policy think tank based in the Estonian capital.‘Critics associate NATO with Abu Ghraib’Through his role at the Swedish Atlantic Council (SAK), Jonson is well acquainted with the debate over relations with NATO in Sweden.

For Jonson, one of the greatest factors influencing Sweden’s relationship with the alliance has been the Reinfeldt government’s pledge to deepen its relationship with NATO.In February, for instance, Swedish Defence Minister Sten Tolgfors said that the country — which already takes part in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme as well as the alliance’s ISAF force in Afghanistan — was looking into joining the NATO Response Force, a 25,000-strong crisis reaction force.

Despite this warming of the political elite to NATO, the public, as well as the majority of parties represented in the Riksdag remain opposed and the distance between the current Swedish debate and actual membership in the alliance is great, Jonson said.

A recent poll in Sweden, for instance, found that 53 percent of Swedes oppose NATO membership while just 29 percent support it. Jonson told The Local that much of this opposition could be attributed to the idea that Sweden, by remaining neutral, held the “moral high ground” during the Cold War. He also pointed out that the alliance has endured criticism in recent decades, reinforcing the idea that Sweden benefits from non-alignment.

“Critics today tend to associate with it with the War in Kosovo, US dominance, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, and these kinds of things,” he said of NATO.He added that the country’s political elite have reached no consensus and that Sweden’s government is wary of pushing the issue, partly due to the defeat of the referendum on joining the euro zone in 2003.“That showcased the government’s inability to mobilize support for political decisions,” he said of the 2003 referendum.

“That has increased the hesitancy of the political establishment for raising the issue again.”The Four Souls of FinlandAcross the Gulf of Bothnia, Tomas Ries from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs argues that the Finnish NATO debate is being coloured by what he calls the “four souls of Finland.”

The old Cold War policy of neutrality, he argues, was the product of a fusion between ardent Finnish nationalists, whom he he calls “Kalevala Finns” and hard-nosed realists, who he describes as “Koivisto Finns” – in honor of Mauno Koivisto, who served as president of Finland from 1982 to 1994.

Interrupting this schema in recent years, however, have been two new emergent political groupings, the so-called idealist position, that opposes participation in the alliance, which Ries has dubbed the “Moomin Finns” in reference to the popular Finnish children’s books, and a more globalized position centered around the business community, that supports integration into NATO.

Ries calls this group the “Nokia Finns.”“Nokia Finns emerged first in the business community when Finnish companies were getting involved in the Western business world in the 1980s,” he said. “In the 1990s, through Nokia joining the business community and through European Union membership, you had a boom, and you saw the rise of a new generation of people who became pretty globalized.

”The “Moomin Finns” instead have taken a more pacific stance on the issue of joining the military alliance. “The idealist position emerged in the late 1990s,” Ries said. “Until then it was considered naive to have these idealistic values,” he said. “But Finland started to join this Western postmodern political community where ideals became increasingly important in politics.

“There is also an attitude that Finland will get in trouble if we get involved in the alliance,” he said. “Some idealists want to keep Finland in its corner. They believe that if they don’t bother anyone, no one will bother them. And that’s not so idealistic,” said Ries.Like Jonson, Ries described the debate in Finland as lacking a sense of urgency. “Insular is the word,” he said. But other developments, like the expansion of NATO to the Baltics, have also had their influence.

“I would imagine that now, after the Estonians come out of their internal NATO meetings, and the Finns come hat in hand and say, ‘Can you tell us what happened at the meeting?’ – Baltic membership has an impact,” he said.He also said that the ongoing debate has softened the Finnish discourse on the topic of the alliance. “The whole NATO question is becoming more and more domesticated,” he said.

“There are more reports and discussions about NATO and gradually it becomes less controversial,” he said.Diverging pathsAccording to Risto Pentillä, a quarter of the Finnish public supports NATO membership, but slightly more than half have continued to oppose it.

He told The Local that the result of Baltic membership has meant that Finnish foreign policy thinkers have continued to “emphasize Finland’s unique geopolitical position, so it hasn’t really moved the debate forward and it hasn’t made Finland more likely to support inclusion in NATO.

”There are also two new elements in the debate, according to Pentillä. “Finland’s policy has been predicated on the assumption that if Finland wanted, and Russia got nasty, Finland could join NATO at any time,” he said.

“Now that the Americans supported MAPs [Membership Action Plans] for Georgia and Ukraine and it didn’t materialize, it puts the entire premise of this position into question,” he said.Another factor has been NATO’s operations in Afghanistan.

Some against joining the alliance argue that fully joining NATO would behoove Finland to send its troops, currently in northern Afghanistan, into the more volatile southern provinces, Pentillä said.Despite these new factors, Pentillä said that Finland is unlikely to join the alliance any time soon.

“The debate hasn’t really moved anywhere in the past 10 years,” he said.

He also said that the fact that Finland has joined NATO’s Response Force this year while Sweden has not shows that the countries may have difficulty in coordinating their positions in the future.

In Sweden, post-euro referendum wariness, coupled with current geopolitical realities, have favoured the partnership approach of the Reinfeldt government, as opposed to a drive to completely join the alliance, according to Pål Jonson.

“There is no sense of urgency to joining NATO right now,” he said.

“There is no monolithic threat from Russia towards Sweden right now. So there is more of an influence deficit than a security deficit that is stopping us from joining the alliance.”Justin Petrone


Denmark maps Arctic ridge in race for polar sovereignty

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/11/europe/EU-GEN-Denmark-Arctic-Claims.php


Future of the Arctic region fraught with uncertainty

http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/editorial/story.html?id=10ee1a98-6202-4912-8605-fe093db24bef

Reinfeldt welcomes guests to Globalisation Forum
08-04-2008

http://www.norden.org/webb/news/news.asp?id=7785&lang=6

Prime ministers inject new vigour into partnership

http://www.norden.org/webb/news/news.asp?id=7791&lang=6

Ministers converge on Riksgränsen

http://www.norden.org/webb/news/news.asp?id=7778&lang=6

Nordic countries vow to boost co-op to better cope with globalization

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/10/content_7952411.htm


UPDATE:

RIA NOVOSTI:

Arctic spring fever

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080421/105550029.html

Stalin and the WWII

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I've considered posting this material, following the documentary "GPU - the Secret Services" that has been aired on the Romanian TV channel "Antena 3" and where an interesting statement drew my attention: "Stalin was rather afraid of Churchill than of Hitler".

Whether the following information source is reliable or not, I can't tell, but many of the things written there happen to match with my own beliefs about the real reasons of the WWII and also with the statements made in the documentary "GPU - the Secret Services" that I've just seen.

It is absurd to think that Hitler was just an insane man that nobody could stop but just with huge human and material losses and after a devastating World war. Needless to say that in the WWI Hitler wasn't present to command, yet it occured.

The version that the WWII wasn't a war of Germany against the whole World, but rather a war of the West against the East, hence a war of capitalism against socialism (a new sociopolitical system installed by the Jews in Russia after the October Revolution and which propelled Jewish Lenin to power) sounds much more plausible.

Socialism proved a functional and pretty reliable system, able to compete shoulder to shoulder with the capitalist one and therefore it began being a threat to the capitalist World, threat that must be removed by any means, including a World war.

Below is a material on Stalin's life and his role in the WWII, which also tells about the valuable key contribution of communist secret agent Richard Sorge and about Leon Trotsky and Sergey Kirov, in my opinion Western bugs infiltrated in the Russian political structures.

~Vera


MAIN QUOTES:

Stalin became increasingly concerned that the Soviet Union would be invaded by Germany. Stalin believed the best way to of dealing with Adolf Hitler was to form an anti-fascist alliance with countries in the west. Stalin argued that even Hitler would not start a war against a united Europe.

Stalin's own interpretation of Britain's rejection of his plan for an antifascist alliance, was that they were involved in a plot with Germany against the Soviet Union.

Winston Churchill sent a personal message to Stalin in April, 1941, explaining how German troop movements suggested that they were about to attack the Soviet Union. However, Stalin was still suspicious of the British and thought that Churchill was trying to trick him into declaring war on Germany.

German soldiers were given the instructions that the "Jewish-Bolshevik system must be destroyed".

Adolf Hitler was aware that to control the vast population of the Soviet Union would always be an extremely difficult task. His way of dealing with the problem was by mass exterminations.

October Revolution had convinced Stalin that their main objective was the destruction of the communist system in the Soviet Union.

At Yalta, the Allies had attempted to persuade Stalin to join in the war with Japan.

However, since the previous meeting the USA had successfully tested the Atom Bomb.

However, wi th the dropping of the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945, the Japanese quickly surrendered and the Allies were successful in preventing Soviet gains in the Far East.

With Germany defeated and the USA now possessing the Atom Bomb, the Allies no longer needed the co-operation of the Soviet Union.

The ending of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union immediately the war ended with Germany in May, 1945 and the insistence that Henry Wallace, the US Secretary of Commerce, resign after he made a speech in support of Soviet economic demands, convinced Stalin that the hostility towards the Soviet Union that had been in existence between the wars, had returned.

Stalin once again became obsessed by the threat of an invasion from the west.

While he was ill, Stalin received a letter from a Dr. Lydia Timashuk claiming that a group of seven doctors, including his own physician, Dr. Vinogradov, were involved in a plot to murder Stalin and some of his close political associates.

The doctors named in the letter were arrested and after being tortured, confessed to being involved in a plot arranged by the American and British intelligence organizations.


SUB-QUOTES:


The first Five Year Plan that was introduced in 1928, concentrated on the development of iron and steel, machine-tools, electric power and transport. Stalin set the workers high targets. He demanded a 111% increase in coal production, 200% increase in iron production and 335% increase in electric power. He justified these demands by claiming that if rapid industrialization did not take place, the Soviet Union would not be able to defend itself against an invasion from capitalist countries in the west.

In the summer of 1932 Stalin became aware that opposition to his policies were growing.

Some party members were publicly criticizing Stalin and calling for the readmission of Leon Trotsky to the party.

When the issue was discussed at the Politburo, Stalin demanded that the critics should be arrested and executed.

Sergey Kirov, who up to this time had been a staunch Stalinist, argued against this policy.

Stalin no doubt began to wonder if Sergey Kirov was willing to wait for his mentor to die before becoming leader of the party. Stalin was particularly concerned by Kirov's willingness to argue with him in public, fearing that this would undermine his authority in the party.

On 1st December, 1934. Sergey Kirov was assassinated by a young party member, Leonid Nikolayev.

Stalin claimed that Nikolayev was part of a larger conspiracy led by Leon Trotsky against the Soviet government. This resulted in the arrest and execution of Lev Kamenev, Gregory Zinoviev, and fifteen other party members.

In September, 1936, Stalin appointed Nikolai Yezhov as head of the NKVD, the Communist Secret Police. Yezhov quickly arranged the arrest of all the leading political figures in the Soviet Union who were critical of Stalin.

In 1936 Nickolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, Genrikh Yagoda, Nikolai Krestinsky and Christian Rakovsky were arrested and accused of being involved with Leon Trotsky in a plot against Stalin. They were all found guilty and were eventually executed.

Stalin now decided to purge the Red Army. Some historians believe that Stalin was telling the truth when he claimed that he had evidence that the army was planning a military coup at this time.


Stalin became increasingly concerned that the Soviet Union would be invaded by Germany. Stalin believed the best way to of dealing with Adolf Hitler was to form an anti-fascist alliance with countries in the west. Stalin argued that even Hitler would not start a war against a united Europe.

Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, was not enthusiastic about forming an alliance with the Soviet Union.

Winston Churchill, an outspoken critic of British foreign policy, agreed with Stalin: "There is no means of maintaining an eastern front against Nazi aggression without the active aid of Russia.

Stalin's own interpretation of Britain's rejection of his plan for an antifascist alliance, was that they were involved in a plot with Germany against the Soviet Union.

This belief was reinforced when Neville Chamberlain met with Adolf Hitler at Munich in September, 1938, and gave into his demands for the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia.
Stalin now believed that the main objective of British foreign policy was to encourage Germany to head east rather than west.

Stalin realized that war with Germany was inevitable. However, to have any chance of victory he needed time to build up his armed forces.

The only way he could obtain time was to do a deal with Hitler.

Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not be foolish enough to fight a war on two fronts. If he could persuade Hitler to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, Germany was likely to invade Western Europe instead.

Meetings soon took place between Vyacheslav Molotov, Litvinov's replacement and Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister.

On 28th August, 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in Moscow. Under the terms of the agreement, both countries promised to remain neutral if either country became involved in a war.

After attempts to negotiate the stationing of Soviet troops in Finland failed, Stalin ordered the Red Army to invade.

Adolf Hitler, who also had designs on Finland, was forced to standby and watch the Soviet Union build up its Baltic defences.

Information on the proposed invasion came to Stalin from various sources. Richard Sorge, an agent working for the Red Orchestra in Japan, obtained information about the proposed invasion as early as December, 1940.

Winston Churchill sent a personal message to Stalin in April, 1941, explaining how German troop movements suggested that they were about to attack the Soviet Union. However, Stalin was still suspicious of the British and thought that Churchill was trying to trick him into declaring war on Germany.

When Sorge's prediction that Germany would invade in May, 1941, did not take place, Stalin became even more convinced that the war would not start until 1942.

The reason for this delay was that Germany had invaded Yugoslavia in April.

Adolf Hitler had expected the Yugoslavs to surrender immediately but because of stubborn resistance, Hitler had to postpone Operation Barbarossa for a few weeks.

On 21st June, 1941, a German sergeant deserted to the Soviet forces. He informed them that the German Army would attack at dawn the following morning. Stalin was reluctant to believe the soldier's story and it was not until the German attack took place that he finally accepted that his attempts to avoid war with Germany until 1942 had failed.

A million Soviet soldiers were drafted into the Stalingrad area. They were supported from an increasing flow of tanks, aircraft and rocket batteries from the factories built east of the Urals, during the Five Year Plans.

Stalin's claim that rapid industrialization would save the Soviet Union from defeat by western invaders was beginning to come true.

Although the German 6th Army continued to make progress towards Stalingrad, they were gradually becoming encircled.

In recognition of his commander's bravery, Adolf Hitler made Friedrich Paulus a Field Marshal on 30th January, 1943. Hitler was furious when a couple of days later Paulus surrendered. The German losses at Stalingrad were 1.5 million men, 3,500 tanks and 3,000 aircraft. It marked the turning point of the war. From this date on, Germany began to retreat.

It was only when the Red Army regained territory previously controlled by the Nazis that the Soviet Government became fully aware of the war crimes that had been committed. Soviet soldiers who had been taken prisoner had been deliberately starved to death. Of the 5,170,000 soldiers captured by the Germans, only 1,053,000 survived.

German soldiers were given the instructions that the "Jewish-Bolshevik system must be destroyed".

Adolf Hitler was aware that to control the vast population of the Soviet Union would always be an extremely difficult task. His way of dealing with the problem was by mass exterminations.

In November, 1943, Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt met together in Teheran, Iran, to discuss military strategy and post-war Europe.

Ever since the Soviet Union had entered the war, Stalin had been demanding that the Allies open-up a second front in Europe.

Churchill and Roosevelt argued that any attempt to land troops in Western Europe would result in heavy casualties.
Until the Soviet's victory at Stalingrad in January, 1943, Stalin had feared that without a second front, Germany would defeat them.

Stalin was still highly suspicious of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and was worried about them signing a peace agreement with Adolf Hitler.

The foreign policies of the capitalist countries since the October Revolution had convinced Stalin that their main objective was the destruction of the communist system in the Soviet Union.

Stalin was fully aware that if Britain and the USA withdrew from the war, the Red Army would have great difficulty in dealing with Germany on its own.

At

Teheran, Stalin reminded Churchill and Roosevelt of a previous promise of landing troops in Western Europe in 1942.

Later they postponed it to the spring of 1943.

Stalin complained that it was now November and there was still no sign of an allied invasion of France.

After lengthy discussions it was agreed that the Allies would mount a major offensive in the spring of 1944.

From the memoirs published by those who took part in the negotiations in Teheran, it would appear that Stalin dominated the conference.

Alan Brook, chief of the British General Staff, was later to say: "I rapidly grew to appreciate the fact that he had a military brain of the very highest calibre. Never once in any of his statements did he make any strategic error, nor did he ever fail to appreciate all the implications of a situation with a quick and unerring eye. In this respect he stood out compared with Roosevelt and Churchill."

The D-Day landings in June, 1944, created a second front, and took the pressure off the Soviet Union and the Red Army made steady progress into territory held by Germany.

Country after country fell to Soviet forces.

Winston Churchill became concerned about the spread of Soviet power and visited Moscow in October, 1944.

Churchill agreed that Rumania and Bulgaria should be under "Soviet influence" but argued that Yugoslavia and Hungary should be shared equally amongst them.

In February, 1945, Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt met again.

This time the conference was held in

Yalta in the Crimea.

With Soviet troops in most of Eastern Europe, Stalin was in a strong negotiating position.

Roosevelt and Churchill tried hard to restrict postwar influence in this area but the only concession they could obtain was a promise that free elections would be held in these countries.

Once again, Poland was the main debating point.

Stalin explained that throughout history Poland had either attacked Russia or had been used as a corridor through which other hostile countries invaded her.

Only a strong, pro-Communist government in Poland would be able to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. (history repeats - see Putin's struggles against the establishment of a US military shield in Poland).

At Yalta, the decision at Teheran to form a United Nations organization was confirmed.

At the conference it was agreed to divide Germany up amongst the Allies.

However, all parties to that agreement were aware that the country that actually took control of Germany would be in the strongest position over the future of this territory.

The main objective of Winston Churchill and Stalin was the capture of Berlin, the capital of Germany.

The leaders of the victorious countries met once more at Potsdam in July, 1945.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had died in April, 1945, had been replaced by the Vice-President, Harry S. Truman.

Although Germany had been defeated, the USA and Britain were still at war with Japan.

At Yalta, the Allies had attempted to persuade Stalin to join in the war with Japan.

By the time the Potsdam meeting took place, they were having doubts about this strategy. Churchill in particular, were afraid that Soviet involvement would lead to an increase in their influence over countries in the Far East.

At Yalta, Stalin had promised to enter the war with Japan within three months of the defeat of Germany.

Originally, it was planned that the conference at Potsdam would confirm this decision.

However, since the previous meeting the USA had successfully tested the Atom Bomb.

Truman's advisers were urging him to use this bomb on Japan.

When Harry S. Truman told Stalin that the USA had a new powerful bomb he appeared pleased and asked no further questions about it.

Truman did not mention that it was a atomic bomb and it appears that Stalin did not initially grasp the significance of this new weapon.

However, wi th the dropping of the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945, the Japanese quickly surrendered and the Allies were successful in preventing Soviet gains in the Far East.

Stalin's main concern at Potsdam was to obtain economic help for the Soviet Union.

Unlike at Yalta, the Allies were no longer willing to look sympathetically at Stalin's demands.

With Germany defeated and the USA now possessing the Atom Bomb, the Allies no longer needed the co-operation of the Soviet Union.

The ending of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union immediately the war ended with Germany in May, 1945 and the insistence that Henry Wallace, the US Secretary of Commerce, resign after he made a speech in support of Soviet economic demands, convinced Stalin that the hostility towards the Soviet Union that had been in existence between the wars, had returned.

Stalin once again became obsessed by the threat of an invasion from the west.

Between 1945 and 1948, Stalin made full use of his abilities by arranging the setting up of communist regimes in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The formation of NATO and the stationing of American troops in Western Europe was a reaction to Stalin's policies and helped ensure the development of the Cold War.

Hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States continued to increase as the world became divided between the two power blocks.

While he was ill, Stalin received a letter from a Dr. Lydia Timashuk claiming that a group of seven doctors, including his own physician, Dr. Vinogradov, were involved in a plot to murder Stalin and some of his close political associates.

The doctors named in the letter were arrested and after being tortured, confessed to being involved in a plot arranged by the American and British intelligence organizations.

FULL-LENGTH ARTICLE:

Joseph Stalin, was born in Gori, Georgia on 21st December, 1879. He was his mother's fourth child to be born in less than four years. The first three died and as Joseph was prone to bad health, his mother feared on several occasions that he would also die. Understandably, given this background, Joseph's mother was very protective towards him as a child. Joseph's father was a bootmaker and his mother took in washing. As a child, Joseph experienced the poverty that most peasants had to endure in Russia at the end of the 19th century. At the age of seven he contacted smallpox. He survived but his face remained scarred for the rest of his life and other children cruelly called him "pocky". Joseph's mother was deeply religious and in 1888 she managed to obtain him a place at the local church school. Despite his health problems, he made good progress at school and eventually won a free scholarship to the Tiflis Theological Seminary. While studying at the seminary he joined a secret organization called Messame Dassy. Members were supporters of Georgian independence from Russia. Some were also socialist revolutionaries and it was through the people he met in this organization that Stalin first came into contact with the ideas of Karl Marx. In May, 1899, Stalin was expelled from the Tiflis Theological Seminary. Several reasons were given for this action including disrespect for those in authority and reading forbidden books. Stalin was later to claim that the real reason was that he had been trying to convert his fellow students to Marxism. For several months after leaving the seminary Stalin was unemployed. He eventually found work by giving private lessons to middle class children. Later, he worked as a clerk at the Tiflis Observatory. He also began writing articles for the socialist Georgian newspaper, Brdzola Khma Vladimir. In 1901 Stalin joined the Social Democratic Labour Party and whereas most of the leaders were living in exile, he stayed in Russia where he helped to organize industrial resistance to Tsarism. On 18th April, 1902, Stalin was arrested after coordinating a strike at the large Rothschild plant at Batum. After spending 18 months in prison Stalin was deported to Siberia.
At the Second Congress of the Social Democratic Labour Party in London in 1903, there was a dispute between Lenin and Julius Martov, two of the party's leaders. Lenin argued for a small party of professional revolutionaries with a large fringe of non-party sympathizers and supporters. Martov disagreed believing it was better to have a large party of activists.
Julius Martov based his ideas on the socialist parties that existed in other European countries such as the British Labour Party. Lenin argued that the situation was different in Russia as it was illegal to form socialist political parties under the Tsar's autocratic government. At the end of the debate Martov won the vote 28-23. Lenin was unwilling to accept the result and formed a faction known as the Bolsheviks. Those who remained loyal to Martov became known as Mensheviks.
Stalin, like Gregory Zinoviev, Anatoli Lunacharsky, Mikhail Lashevich, Nadezhda Krupskaya, Mikhail Frunze, Alexei Rykov, Yakov Sverdlov, Lev Kamenev, Maxim Litvinov, Vladimir Antonov, Felix Dzerzhinsky, Gregory Ordzhonikidze and Alexander Bogdanov joined the Bolsheviks. Whereas George Plekhanov, Pavel Axelrod, Lev Deich, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, Leon Trotsky, Vera Zasulich, Irakli Tsereteli, Moisei Uritsky, Noi Zhordania, Andrei Vyshinsky and Fedor Dan supported Julius Martov. In 1904 Stalin escaped from Siberia and within a few months he was back organizing demonstrations and strikes in Tiflis. Vladimir Lenin was impressed with Stalin's achievements and in 1905 he was invited to meet him in Finland. Stalin returned to Russia and over the next eight years he was arrested four times but each time managed to escape. In 1911 he moved to St, Petersburg and the following year became editor of Pravda. Arrested again in 1913, Stalin was exiled for life to North Siberia. After the overthrow of Nicholas II, the new prime minister, Alexander Kerensky, allowed all political prisoners to return to their homes. Stalin went back to St. Petersburg and once again became one of the editors of Pravda. At this time, Stalin, like most Bolsheviks, took the view that the Russian people were not ready for a socialist revolution.
When Lenin returned to Russia on 3rd April, 1917, he announced what became known as the April Theses. Lenin attacked Bolsheviks for supporting the Provisional Government. Instead, he argued, revolutionaries should be telling the people of Russia that they should take over the control of the country. In his speech, Lenin urged the peasants to take the land from the rich landlords and the industrial workers to seize the factories.
Lenin accused those Bolsheviks who were still supporting the Provisional Government of betraying socialism and suggested that they should leave the party. Some took Lenin's advice, arguing that any attempt at revolution at this stage was bound to fail and would lead to another repressive, authoritarian Russian government.
Stalin was in a difficult position. As one of the editors of Pravda, he was aware that he was being held partly responsible for what Lenin had described as "betraying socialism". Stalin had two main options open to him: he could oppose Lenin and challenge him for the leadership of the party, or he could change his mind about supporting the Provisional Government and remain loyal to Lenin.
After ten days of silence, Stalin made his move. In Pravda he wrote an article dismissing the idea of working with the Provisional Government. He condemned Alexander Kerensky and Victor Chernov as counter-revolutionaries, and urged the peasants to takeover the land for themselves. In November, 1917, Lenin rewarded Stalin for his support of the October Revolution by appointing him Commissar of Nationalities. Lenin joked to Stalin that: "You know, to pass so quickly from an underground existence to power makes one dizzy."
As a Georgian and a member of a minority group who had written about the problems of non-Russian peoples living under the Tsar, Stalin was seen as the obvious choice as Commissar of Nationalities. It was a job that gave Stalin tremendous power for nearly half the country's population fell into the category of non-Russian. Stalin now had the responsibility of dealing with 65 million Ukrainians, Georgians, Byelorussians, Tadzhiks, Buriats and Yakuts.
The policy of the Bolsheviks was to grant the right of self-determination to all the various nationalities within Russia. This was reinforced by a speech Stalin made in Helsinki on November 16th, 1917. Stalin promised the crowd that the Soviet government would grant: "complete freedom for the Finnish people, and for other peoples of Russia, to arrange their own life!" Stalin's plan was to develop what he called "a voluntary and honest alliance" between Russia and the different national groups that lived within its borders.
Over the next couple of years Stalin had difficulty controlling the non-Russian peoples under his control. Independent states were set up without his agreement. These new governments were often hostile to the Bolsheviks. Stalin had hoped that these independent states would voluntarily agree to join up with Russia to form a union of Socialist States. When this did not happen Stalin was forced to revise his policy and stated that self-determination: "ought to be understood as the right of self-determination not of the bourgeoisie but of the toiling masses of a given nation." In other words, unless these independent states had a socialist government willing to develop a union with Russia, the Bolsheviks would not allow self-determination.
Lenin also changed his views on independence. He now came to the conclusion that a "modern economy required a high degree of power in the centre." Although the Bolsheviks had promised nearly half the Russian population that they would have self-determination, Lenin was now of the opinion that such a policy could pose a serious threat to the survival of the Soviet government. It was the broken promise over self-determination that was just one of the many reasons why Lenin's government became unpopular in Russia.
During the Civil War Stalin played an important administrative role in military matters and took the credit for successfully defeating the White Army at Tsaritsyn. One strategy developed by Stalin was to conduct interviews with local administrators on a large barge moored on the Volga. It was later claimed that if Stalin was not convinced of their loyalty they were shot and thrown into the river.
In August, 1918, Moisei Uritsky, chief of the Petrograd Secret Police was assassinated. Two two weeks later Dora Kaplan shot and severely wounded Lenin. Stalin, who was in Tsaritsyn at the time, sent a telegram advocating an "open and systematic mass terror" against those responsible. The advice of Stalin was accepted and in September, 1918, Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of the Cheka, instigated as the Red Terror. It is estimated that in the next few months 800 socialists were arrested and shot without trial.
The Soviet's government's policy of War Communism during the Civil War created social distress and led to riots, strikes and demonstrations. The Kronstadt Uprising reinforced the idea that the government was unpopular and in March, 1921, Vladimir Lenin announced details of his New Economic Policy (NEP). Farmers were now allowed to sell food on the open market and could now employ people to work for them.
The New Economic Policy also allowed some freedom of internal trade, permitted some private commerce and re-established state banks. Factories employing less than twenty people were denationalized and could be claimed back by former owners.
Stalin supported Lenin's policy. His view was that as long as there was only a one party state, the government could allow the introduction of small-scale private enterprise. As he pointed out: "The New Economic Policy is a special policy of the proletarian state designed to tolerate capitalism but retain the key positions in the hands of the proletarian state."
Lenin found the disagreements over the New Economic Policy exhausting. His health had been poor ever since Dora Kaplan had shot him in 1918. Severe headaches limited his sleep and understandably he began to suffer from fatigue. Lenin decided he needed someone to help him control the Communist Party.
At the Party Conference in April, 1922, Lenin suggested that a new post of General Secretary should be created. Lenin's choice for the post was Stalin, who in the past had always loyally supported his policies. Stalin's main opponents for the future leadership of the party failed to see the importance of this position and actually supported his nomination. They initially saw the post of General Secretary as being no more than "Lenin's mouthpiece".
Soon after Stalin's appointment as General Secretary, Lenin went into hospital to have a bullet removed from his body that had been there since Kaplan's assassination attempt. It was hoped that this operation would restore his health. This was not to be; soon afterwards, a blood vessel broke in Lenin's brain. This left him paralyzed all down his right side and for a time he was unable to speak. As "Lenin's mouthpiece", Stalin had suddenly become extremely important.
While Lenin was immobilized, Stalin made full use of his powers as General Secretary. At the Party Congress he had been granted permission to expel "unsatisfactory" party members. This enabled Stalin to remove thousands of supporters of Leon Trotsky, his main rival for the leadership of the party. As General Secretary, Stalin also had the power to appoint and sack people from important positions in the government. The new holders of these posts were fully aware that they owed their promotion to Stalin. They also knew that if their behaviour did not please Stalin they would be replaced.
Surrounded by his supporters, Stalin's confidence began to grow. In October, 1922, he disagreed with Lenin over the issue of foreign trade. When the matter was discussed at Central Committee, Stalin's rather Lenin's policy was accepted. Lenin began to fear that Stalin was taking over the leadership of the party. Lenin wrote to Leon Trotsky asking for his support. Trotsky agreed and at the next meeting of the Central Committee the decision on foreign trade was reversed. Lenin, who was too ill to attend, wrote to Trotsky congratulating him on his success and suggesting that in future they should work together against Stalin.
Stalin, whose wife Nadya Alliluyeva worked in Lenin's private office, soon discovered the contents of the letter sent to Leon Trotsky. Stalin was furious as he realized that if Lenin and Trotsky worked together against him, his political career would be at an end. In a fit of temper Stalin made an abusive phone-call to Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, accusing her of endangering Lenin's life by allowing him to write letters when he was so ill.
After Krupskaya told her husband of the phone-call, Lenin made the decision that Stalin was not the man to replace him as the leader of the party. Lenin knew he was close to death so he dictated to his secretary a letter that he wanted to serve as his last "will and testament". The document was comprised of his thoughts on the senior members of the party leadership.
Lenin became increasing concerned about Stalin's character and wrote a testament in which he suggested that he be removed. "Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated enormous power in his hands: and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. I therefore propose to our comrades to consider a means of removing Stalin from this post and appointing someone else who differs from Stalin in one weighty respect: being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite, more considerate of his comrades." However, Lenin died before any action was taken. Stalin now emerged as the leader of the Soviet Union. When he first gained power Stalin continued Lenin's New Economic Policy. Farmers were allowed to sell food on the open market and were allowed to employ people to work for them. Those farmers who expanded the size of their farms became known as kulaks. In 1928 Stalin began attacking kulaks for not supplying enough food for industrial workers. He also advocated the setting up of collective farms. The proposal involved small farmers joining forces to form large-scale units. In this way, it was argued, they would be in a position to afford the latest machinery. Stalin believed this policy would lead to increased production. However, the peasants liked farming their own land and were reluctant to form themselves into state collectives. Stalin was furious that the peasants were putting their own welfare before that of the Soviet Union. Local communist officials were given instructions to confiscate kulaks property. This land was then used to form new collective farms. Thousands of kulaks were executed and an estimated five million were deported to Siberia or Central Asia. Of these, approximately twenty-five per cent perished by the time they reached their destination.
After the death of Lenin, Stalin joined forces with two left-wing members of the Politburo, Gregory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, to keep Leon Trotsky from power. Both these men had reason to believe that Trotsky would dismiss them from the government once he became leader. Stalin encouraged these fears. He also suggested that old party activists like themselves had more right to lead the Bolsheviks than Trotsky, who had only joined the party in 1917.
Leon Trotsky accused Stalin of being dictatorial and called for the introduction of more democracy into the party. Gregory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev united behind Stalin and accused Trotsky of creating divisions in the party.
Trotsky's main hope of gaining power was for Lenin's last testament to be published. In May, 1924, Lenin's widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya, demanded that the Central Committee announce its contents to the rest of the party. Gregory Zinoviev argued strongly against its publication. He finished his speech with the words: "You have all witnessed our harmonious cooperation in the last few months, and, like myself, you will be happy to say that Lenin's fears have proved baseless." The new members of the Central Committee, who had been sponsored by Stalin, guaranteed that the vote went against Lenin's testament being made public.
In 1925 Stalin was able to arrange for Leon Trotsky to be removed from the government. Some of Trotsky's supporters pleaded with him to organize a military coup. As commissar of war Trotsky was in a good position to arrange this. However, Trotsky rejected the idea and instead resigned his post.
With the decline of Trotsky, Joseph Stalin felt strong enough to stop sharing power with Lev Kamenev and Gregory Zinoviev. Stalin now began to attack Trotsky's belief in the need for world revolution. He argued that the party's main priority should be to defend the communist system that had been developed in the Soviet Union. This put Zinoviev and Kamenev in an awkward position. They had for a long time been strong supporters of Trotsky's theory that if revolution did not spread to other countries, the communist system in the Soviet Union was likely to be overthrown by hostile, capitalist nations. However, they were reluctant to speak out in favour of a man whom they had been in conflict with for so long. When Stalin was finally convinced that Lev Kamenev and Gregory Zinoviev were unwilling to join forces with Leon Trotsky against him, he began to support openly the economic policies of right-wing members of the Politburo such as Nikolay Bukharin, Mikhail Tomsky and Alexei Rykov. They now realized what Stalin was up to but it took them to summer of 1926 before they could swallow their pride and join with Trotsky against Stalin.
When Lev Kamenev and Gregory Zinoviev eventually began attacking his policies, Joseph Stalin argued they were creating disunity in the party and managed to have them expelled from the Central Committee. The belief that the party would split into two opposing factions was a strong fear amongst communists in the country. They were convinced that if this happened, western countries would take advantage of the situation and invade the Soviet Union. Under pressure from the Central Committee, Lev Kamenev and Gregory Zinoviev agreed to sign statements promising not to create conflict in the movement by making speeches attacking official policies. Leon Trotsky refused to sign and was banished to the remote area of Kazhakstan.
In 1927 Stalin's advisers told him that with the modernization of farming the Soviet Union would require an extra 250,000 tractors. As well as tractors there was also a need to develop the oil fields to provide the necessary petrol to drive the machines. Power stations also had to be built to supply the farms with electricity.
Since the October Revolution industrial progress had been slow. It was not until 1927 that production had reached the levels achieved before the start of the First World War. Stalin decided that he would use his control over the country to modernize the economy.
The first Five Year Plan that was introduced in 1928, concentrated on the development of iron and steel, machine-tools, electric power and transport. Stalin set the workers high targets. He demanded a 111% increase in coal production, 200% increase in iron production and 335% increase in electric power. He justified these demands by claiming that if rapid industrialization did not take place, the Soviet Union would not be able to defend itself against an invasion from capitalist countries in the west.
Every factory had large display boards erected that showed the output of workers. Those that failed to reach the required targets were publicity criticized and humiliated. Some workers could not cope with this pressure and absenteeism increased. This led to even more repressive measures being introduced. Records were kept of workers' lateness, absenteeism and bad workmanship. If the worker's record was poor, he was accused of trying to sabotage the Five Year Plan and if found guilty could be shot or sent to work as forced labour on the Baltic Sea Canal or the Siberian Railway.
With the modernization of industry, Stalin argued that it was necessary to pay higher wages to certain workers in order to encourage increased output.
His left-wing opponents claimed that this inequality was a betrayal of socialism and would create a new class system in the Soviet Union. Stalin had his way and during the 1930s, the gap between the wages of the labourers and the skilled workers increased.
In the summer of 1932 Stalin became aware that opposition to his policies were growing.
Some party members were publicly criticizing Stalin and calling for the readmission of Leon Trotsky to the party.
When the issue was discussed at the Politburo, Stalin demanded that the critics should be arrested and executed.
Sergey Kirov, who up to this time had been a staunch Stalinist, argued against this policy. When the vote was taken, the majority of the Politburo supported Kirov against Stalin.
In the spring of 1934 Sergey Kirov put forward a policy of reconciliation.
He argued that people should be released from prison who had opposed the government's policy on collective farms and industrialization. Once again, Stalin found himself in a minority in the Politburo.
After years of arranging for the removal of his opponents from the party, Stalin realized he still could not rely on the total support of the people whom he had replaced them with.
Stalin no doubt began to wonder if Sergey Kirov was willing to wait for his mentor to die before becoming leader of the party. Stalin was particularly concerned by Kirov's willingness to argue with him in public, fearing that this would undermine his authority in the party.
As usual, that summer Kirov and Stalin went on holiday together. Stalin, who treated Kirov like a son, used this opportunity to try to persuade him to remain loyal to his leadership. Stalin asked him to leave Leningrad to join him in Moscow. Stalin wanted Kirov in a place where he could keep a close eye on him. When Kirov refused, Stalin knew he had lost control over his protégé.
On 1st December, 1934. Sergey Kirov was assassinated by a young party member, Leonid Nikolayev.
Stalin claimed that Nikolayev was part of a larger conspiracy led by Leon Trotsky against the Soviet government. This resulted in the arrest and execution of Lev Kamenev, Gregory Zinoviev, and fifteen other party members.
In September, 1936, Stalin appointed Nikolai Yezhov as head of the NKVD, the Communist Secret Police. Yezhov quickly arranged the arrest of all the leading political figures in the Soviet Union who were critical of Stalin.
The Secret Police broke prisoners down by intense interrogation. This included the threat to arrest and execute members of the prisoner's family if they did not confess. The interrogation went on for several days and nights and eventually they became so exhausted and disoriented that they signed confessions agreeing that they had been attempting to overthrow the government.
In 1936 Nickolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, Genrikh Yagoda, Nikolai Krestinsky and Christian Rakovsky were arrested and accused of being involved with Leon Trotsky in a plot against Stalin. They were all found guilty and were eventually executed.
Stalin now decided to purge the Red Army. Some historians believe that Stalin was telling the truth when he claimed that he had evidence that the army was planning a military coup at this time.
Leopold Trepper, head of the Soviet spy ring in Germany, believed that the evidence was planted by a double agent who worked for both Stalin and Adolf Hitler.
Trepper's theory is that the "chiefs of Nazi counter-espionage" took "advantage of the paranoia raging in the Soviet Union," by supplying information that led to Stalin executing his top military leaders.
In June, 1937, Mikhail Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army commanders were charged with conspiracy with Germany.
All eight were convicted and executed. All told, 30,000 members of the armed forces were executed. This included fifty per cent of all army officers.
The last stage of the terror was the purging of the NKVD.
Stalin wanted to make sure that those who knew too much about the purges would also be killed.
Stalin announced to the country that "fascist elements" had taken over the security forces which had resulted in innocent people being executed.
He appointed Lavrenti Beria as the new head of the Secret Police and he was instructed to find out who was responsible. After his investigations, Beria arranged the executions of all the senior figures in the organization.
Stalin supported the Popular Front government in Spain.
After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War he sent large quantities of Soviet tanks and aircraft to the Republicans.
They were accompanied by a large number of tank-drivers and pilots from the Soviet Union.
All told, about 850 Soviet advisers, pilots, technical personnel and interpreters took part in the war.
Stalin became increasingly concerned that the Soviet Union would be invaded by Germany. Stalin believed the best way to of dealing with Adolf Hitler was to form an anti-fascist alliance with countries in the west. Stalin argued that even Hitler would not start a war against a united Europe.
Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, was not enthusiastic about forming an alliance with the Soviet Union.
He wrote to a friend: "I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears."
Winston Churchill, an outspoken critic of British foreign policy, agreed with Stalin: "There is no means of maintaining an eastern front against Nazi aggression without the active aid of Russia.
Russian interests are deeply concerned in preventing Herr Hitler's designs on eastern Europe.
It should still be possible to range all the States and peoples from the Baltic to the Black sea in one solid front against a new outrage of invasion.
Such a front, if established in good heart, and with resolute and efficient military arrangements, combined with the strength of the Western Powers, may yet confront Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Ribbentrop, Goebbels and co. with forces the German people would be reluctant to challenge."
Stalin's own interpretation of Britain's rejection of his plan for an antifascist alliance, was that they were involved in a plot with Germany against the Soviet Union.
This belief was reinforced when Neville Chamberlain met with Adolf Hitler at Munich in September, 1938, and gave into his demands for the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia.
Stalin now believed that the main objective of British foreign policy was to encourage Germany to head east rather than west.
Stalin realized that war with Germany was inevitable. However, to have any chance of victory he needed time to build up his armed forces.
The only way he could obtain time was to do a deal with Hitler.
Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not be foolish enough to fight a war on two fronts. If he could persuade Hitler to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, Germany was likely to invade Western Europe instead.
On 3rd May, 1939, Stalin dismissed Maxim Litvinov, his Jewish Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
Litvinov had been closely associated with the Soviet Union's policy of an antifascist alliance.
Meetings soon took place between Vyacheslav Molotov, Litvinov's replacement and Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister.
On 28th August, 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in Moscow. Under the terms of the agreement, both countries promised to remain neutral if either country became involved in a war.
Stalin now ordered the Red Army into Poland and reclaimed land lost when the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed in 1918.
Another aspect of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that made the Soviet Union vulnerable to attack was the loss of Finland.
Leningrad was only thirty-two kilometres from the Finnish border. This made Leningrad and its 3.5 million population, a potential target of artillery fire. Stalin therefore began to consider the Invasion of Finland.
After attempts to negotiate the stationing of Soviet troops in Finland failed, Stalin ordered the Red Army to invade.
Adolf Hitler, who also had designs on Finland, was forced to standby and watch the Soviet Union build up its Baltic defences.
It took the Soviet troops three months to force the Finnish government to agree to Stalin's original demands. Although the world was now aware of Stalin's shrewdness in foreign affairs, Finland's small army of 200,000 men had exposed the Soviet Union's poorly trained and equipped army.
Stalin believed that Germany would not invade the Soviet Union until Britain and France had been conquered. From Stalin's own calculations, this would not be until the summer of 1942. Some of his closest advisers began to argue that 1941 would be a much more likely date. The surrender of France in June, 1940, also cast doubts on Stalin's calculations.
Stalin's response to France's defeat was to send Vyacheslav Molotov to Berlin for more discussions.
Molotov was instructed to draw out these talks for as long as possible.
Stalin knew that if Adolf Hitler did not attack the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, he would have to wait until 1942.
No one, not even someone as rash as Hitler, would invade the Soviet Union in the winter, he argued.
Germany was now in a strong negotiating position and Molotov found it impossible to agree to Hitler's demands.
As soon as talks broke-up, Hitler ordered his military leaders to prepare for Operation Barbarossa.
The plan was for the invasion of the Soviet Union to start on the 15th May, 1941. Hitler believed that this would give the German Army enough time to take control of the country before the harsh Soviet winter set in.
Information on the proposed invasion came to Stalin from various sources. Richard Sorge, an agent working for the Red Orchestra in Japan, obtained information about the proposed invasion as early as December, 1940.
Winston Churchill sent a personal message to Stalin in April, 1941, explaining how German troop movements suggested that they were about to attack the Soviet Union. However, Stalin was still suspicious of the British and thought that Churchill was trying to trick him into declaring war on Germany.
When Sorge's prediction that Germany would invade in May, 1941, did not take place, Stalin became even more convinced that the war would not start until 1942.
The reason for this delay was that Germany had invaded Yugoslavia in April.
Adolf Hitler had expected the Yugoslavs to surrender immediately but because of stubborn resistance, Hitler had to postpone Operation Barbarossa for a few weeks.
On 21st June, 1941, a German sergeant deserted to the Soviet forces. He informed them that the German Army would attack at dawn the following morning. Stalin was reluctant to believe the soldier's story and it was not until the German attack took place that he finally accepted that his attempts to avoid war with Germany until 1942 had failed.
The German forces, made up of three million men and 3,400 tanks, advanced in three groups.
The north group headed for Leningrad, the centre group for Moscow and the southern forces into the Ukraine.
Within six days, the German Army had captured Minsk. General Demitry Pavlov, the man responsible for defending Minsk, and two of his senior generals were recalled to Moscow and were shot for incompetence.
With the execution of Pavlov and his generals, Stalin made it clear that he would punish severely any commander whom he believed had let down the Soviet Union.
In future, Soviet commanders thought twice about surrendering or retreating.
Another factor in this was the way that the German Army massacred the people of Minsk.
Terrified of both Stalin and Adolf Hitler, the Soviet people had no option but to fight until they were killed.
The first few months of the war was disastrous for the Soviet Union. The German northern forces surrounded Leningrad while the centre group made steady progress towards Moscow.
German forces had also made deep inroads into the Ukraine. Kiev was under siege and Stalin's Chief of Staff, Georgi Zhukov, suggested that the troops defending the capital of the Ukraine should be withdrawn, thus enabling them to take up strong defensive positions further east.
Stalin insisted that the troops stayed and by the time Kiev was taken, the casualties were extremely high. It was the most comprehensive defeat experienced by the Red Army in its history. However, the determined resistance put up at Kiev, had considerably delayed the attack on Moscow.
It was now September and winter was fast approaching. As German troops moved deeper into the Soviet Union, supply lines became longer. Stalin gave instructions that when forced to withdraw, the Red Army should destroy anything that could be of use to the enemy. The scorched earth policy and the formation of guerrilla units behind the German front lines, created severe problems for the German war machine which was trying to keep her three million soldiers supplied with the necessary food and ammunition.
By October, 1941, German troops were only fifteen miles outside Moscow.
Orders were given for a mass evacuation of the city. In two weeks, two million people left Moscow and headed east. Stalin rallied morale by staying in Moscow. In a bomb-proof air raid shelter positioned under the Kremlin, Stalin, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, directed the Soviet war effort. All major decisions made by his front-line commanders had to be cleared with Stalin first.
In November, 1941, the German Army launched a new offensive on Moscow.
The Soviet army held out and the Germans were brought to a halt. Stalin called for a counter-attack. His commanders had doubts about this policy but Stalin insisted and on 4th December the Red Army attacked.
The German forces, demoralized by its recent lack of success, was taken by surprise and started to retreat. By January, the Germans had been pushed back 200 miles.
Stalin's military strategy was basically fairly simple. He believed it was vitally important to attack the enemy as often as possible.
He was particularly keen to use new, fresh troops for these offensives. Stalin argued that countries in western Europe had been beaten by their own fear of German superiority.
His main objective in using new troops in this way was to convince them that the German forces were not invincible.
By pushing the German Army back at Moscow, Stalin proved to the Soviet troops that Blizkrieg could be counteracted; it also provided an important example to all troops throughout the world fighting the German war-machine.
The German Army was severely handicapped by the Soviet winter of 1941-42 and once spring arrived they began to advance once again. German forces were particularly successful in the south and they were able to close in on Stalingrad.
Stalin was horrified to hear reports that the Red Army in the Ukraine had been in such a hurry to retreat that they had left behind their weapons and equipment.
Not only were soldiers shot for desertion but Stalin gave permission for highly critical articles of the army to be published in the newspapers.
The army, which had been praised during the early stages of the war, was now accused of betraying the Soviet people. It was an extremely risky move on Stalin's part, but it had the desired effect and its performance improved.
Stalingrad was Stalin's city.
It had been named after him as a result of his defence of the city during the Russian Civil War. Stalin insisted that it should be held at all costs. One historian has claimed that he saw Stalingrad "as the symbol of his own authority." Stalin also knew that if Stalingrad was taken, the way would be open for Moscow to be attacked from the east. If Moscow was cut off in this way, the defeat of the Soviet Union was virtually inevitable.
A million Soviet soldiers were drafted into the Stalingrad area. They were supported from an increasing flow of tanks, aircraft and rocket batteries from the factories built east of the Urals, during the Five Year Plans. Stalin's claim that rapid industrialization would save the Soviet Union from defeat by western invaders was beginning to come true.
General Georgi Zhukov, the military leader who had yet to be defeated in a battle, was put in charge of the defence of Stalingrad. The line held and on 19th November, 1942, Stalin gave the order to counterattack from the north and the south.
Although the German 6th Army continued to make progress towards Stalingrad, they were gradually becoming encircled.
General Friedrich Paulus, the German commander, asked permission to withdraw but Adolf Hitler refused and instructed him to continue to advance on Stalingrad. This they did, but with their supplies cut-off from the west, they were unable to take the city.
In recognition of his commander's bravery, Adolf Hitler made Friedrich Paulus a Field Marshal on 30th January, 1943. Hitler was furious when a couple of days later Paulus surrendered. The German losses at Stalingrad were 1.5 million men, 3,500 tanks and 3,000 aircraft. It marked the turning point of the war. From this date on, Germany began to retreat.
It was only when the Red Army regained territory previously controlled by the Nazis that the Soviet Government became fully aware of the war crimes that had been committed. Soviet soldiers who had been taken prisoner had been deliberately starved to death. Of the 5,170,000 soldiers captured by the Germans, only 1,053,000 survived.
Women and children were also killed in large numbers. The Jews were always the first to be executed, but other groups, especially the Russians, were also killed.
German soldiers were given the instructions that the "Jewish-Bolshevik system must be destroyed".
Adolf Hitler was aware that to control the vast population of the Soviet Union would always be an extremely difficult task. His way of dealing with the problem was by mass exterminations.
Soviet authorities estimated that in all, over twenty million of their people were killed during the Second World War.
However, it has been argued that Hitler's policy of exterminating the Soviet people guaranteed his defeat.
Stories of German atrocities soon reached Red Army soldiers fighting at the front.
Faced with the choice of being executed or being killed fighting, the vast majority chose the latter. Unlike most other soldiers, when faced with defeat in battle, the Soviet army rarely surrendered.
This was also true of civilians. When territory was taken by the German Army, women, children and old men went into hiding and formed guerrilla units. These groups, who concentrated on disrupting German supply lines, proved a constant problem to the German forces.
In November, 1943, Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt met together in Teheran, Iran, to discuss military strategy and post-war Europe.
Ever since the Soviet Union had entered the war, Stalin had been demanding that the Allies open-up a second front in Europe. ?????????
Churchill and Roosevelt argued that any attempt to land troops in Western Europe would result in heavy casualties.
Until the Soviet's victory at Stalingrad in January, 1943, Stalin had feared that without a second front, Germany would defeat them.
Stalin, who always favoured in offensive strategy, believed that there were political, as well as military reasons for the Allies' failure to open up a second front in Europe.
Stalin was still highly suspicious of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and was worried about them signing a peace agreement with Adolf Hitler.
The foreign policies of the capitalist countries since the October Revolution had convinced Stalin that their main objective was the destruction of the communist system in the Soviet Union.
Stalin was fully aware that if Britain and the USA withdrew from the war, the Red Army would have great difficulty in dealing with Germany on its own.
At Teheran, Stalin reminded Churchill and Roosevelt of a previous promise of landing troops in Western Europe in 1942.
Later they postponed it to the spring of 1943.
Stalin complained that it was now November and there was still no sign of an allied invasion of France.
After lengthy discussions it was agreed that the Allies would mount a major offensive in the spring of 1944.
From the memoirs published by those who took part in the negotiations in Teheran, it would appear that Stalin dominated the conference.
Alan Brook, chief of the British General Staff, was later to say: "I rapidly grew to appreciate the fact that he had a military brain of the very highest calibre. Never once in any of his statements did he make any strategic error, nor did he ever fail to appreciate all the implications of a situation with a quick and unerring eye. In this respect he stood out compared with Roosevelt and Churchill."
The D-Day landings in June, 1944, created a second front, and took the pressure off the Soviet Union and the Red Army made steady progress into territory held by Germany.
Country after country fell to Soviet forces.
Winston Churchill became concerned about the spread of Soviet power and visited Moscow in October, 1944.
Churchill agreed that Rumania and Bulgaria should be under "Soviet influence" but argued that Yugoslavia and Hungary should be shared equally amongst them.
The most heated discussion concerned the future of Poland. The Polish Government in exile, based in London, had a reputation for being extremely anti-Communist. Although Stalin was willing to negotiate with the Polish prime minister, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, he insisted that he was unwilling to have a government in Poland that was actively hostile to the Soviet Union.
In February, 1945, Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt met again.
This time the conference was held in Yalta in the Crimea.
With Soviet troops in most of Eastern Europe, Stalin was in a strong negotiating position.
Roosevelt and Churchill tried hard to restrict postwar influence in this area but the only concession they could obtain was a promise that free elections would be held in these countries.
Once again, Poland was the main debating point.
Stalin explained that throughout history Poland had either attacked Russia or had been used as a corridor through which other hostile countries invaded her.
Only a strong, pro-Communist government in Poland would be able to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union.
Stalin also promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan three months after the war with Germany ended and in return would recover what Russia had lost at the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).
At Yalta, the decision at Teheran to form a United Nations organization was confirmed.
It was only on this issue that all three leaders were enthusiastically in agreement.
At the time of Yalta, Germany was close to defeat.
British and USA troops were advancing from the west and the Red Army from the east.
At the conference it was agreed to divide Germany up amongst the Allies.
However, all parties to that agreement were aware that the country that actually took control of Germany would be in the strongest position over the future of this territory.
The main objective of Winston Churchill and Stalin was the capture of Berlin, the capital of Germany.
Franklin D. Roosevelt did not agree and the decision of the USA Military commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, to head south-east to Dresden, ensured that Soviet forces would be the first to reach Berlin.
The leaders of the victorious countries met once more at Potsdam in July, 1945.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had died in April, 1945, had been replaced by the Vice-President, Harry S. Truman.
While the conference was taking place, the British General Election results were announced. The landslide victory of the Labour Party meant that Clement Attlee replaced Winston Churchill as Britain's main negotiator.
Although Germany had been defeated, the USA and Britain were still at war with Japan.
At Yalta, the Allies had attempted to persuade Stalin to join in the war with Japan.
By the time the Potsdam meeting took place, they were having doubts about this strategy. Churchill in particular, were afraid that Soviet involvement would lead to an increase in their influence over countries in the Far East.
At Yalta, Stalin had promised to enter the war with Japan within three months of the defeat of Germany.
Originally, it was planned that the conference at Potsdam would confirm this decision.
However, since the previous meeting the USA had successfully tested the Atom Bomb.
Truman's advisers were urging him to use this bomb on Japan. They also pointed out that its employment would avoid an invasion of Japan and thus save the lives of up to two million American troops.
When Harry S. Truman told Stalin that the USA had a new powerful bomb he appeared pleased and asked no further questions about it.
Truman did not mention that it was a atomic bomb and it appears that Stalin did not initially grasp the significance of this new weapon.
However, with the dropping of the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945, the Japanese quickly surrendered and the Allies were successful in preventing Soviet gains in the Far East.
Stalin's main concern at Potsdam was to obtain economic help for the Soviet Union.
Nearly a quarter of Soviet property had been destroyed during the Second World War. This included 31,000 of her factories. Agriculture had also been badly hit and food was being strictly rationed.
Stalin had been told by his advisers that under-nourishment of the workforce was causing low-productivity. He believed that the best way to revive the Soviet economy was to obtain massive reparation payments from Germany.
Unlike at Yalta, the Allies were no longer willing to look sympathetically at Stalin's demands.
With Germany defeated and the USA now possessing the Atom Bomb, the Allies no longer needed the co-operation of the Soviet Union.
Stalin felt betrayed by this change of attitude. He believed that the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt was an important factor in this.
The ending of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union immediately the war ended with Germany in May, 1945 and the insistence that Henry Wallace, the US Secretary of Commerce, resign after he made a speech in support of Soviet economic demands, convinced Stalin that the hostility towards the Soviet Union that had been in existence between the wars, had returned.
Stalin once again became obsessed by the threat of an invasion from the west.
Between 1945 and 1948, Stalin made full use of his abilities by arranging the setting up of communist regimes in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
He now had a large buffer zone of "friendly states" on his western border.
Western powers interpreted these events as an example of Stalin's desire to impose communism on the whole of Europe.
The formation of NATO and the stationing of American troops in Western Europe was a reaction to Stalin's policies and helped ensure the development of the Cold War.
In 1948, Stalin ordered an economic blockade of Berlin. He hoped this measure would help him secure full control over Berlin. The Allies airlifted supplies to the beleaguered Berlin and and Stalin was eventually forced to back down and allow the land and air routes to be reopened.
Stalin also miscalculated over Korea. In 1950, he encouraged Kim Il Sung, the communist ruler of North Korea, to invade South Korea. Stalin had assumed that the USA would not interfere and that Kim IL Sung would be able to unite Korea as a communist state.
Stalin's timing was particularly bad on this occasion as the Soviet representative had at that time been ordered to boycott the Security Council. With the Soviet Union unable to use its veto, it was powerless to stop the United Nations sending troops to defend South Korea.
The Korean War ended in 1953. Not only had the communists failed to unite Korea, the war also provided support for those right-wing American politicians such as Joseph McCarthy who had been arguing that the Soviet Union wanted to control the world.
Hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States continued to increase as the world became divided between the two power blocks.
Harry S. Truman and Winston Churchill may have been responsible for the start of the Cold War but Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe and Korea had ensured its continuance.
At home, Stalin was closely associated with the Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War and so his prestige and status remained high. His only possible rival for the leadership was Georgi Zhukov, who had played such an important role in the defeat of Germany.
Stalin's response to the public acclaim that Zhukov received was to accuse him of "immodesty, unjustified conceit, and megalomania." After the war Zhukov was demoted and once again Stalin had removed from power someone who was potentially his successor.
Now in his seventies, Stalin's health began to deteriorate. His main problem was high blood-pressure.
While he was ill, Stalin received a letter from a Dr. Lydia Timashuk claiming that a group of seven doctors, including his own physician, Dr. Vinogradov, were involved in a plot to murder Stalin and some of his close political associates.
The doctors named in the letter were arrested and after being tortured, confessed to being involved in a plot arranged by the American and British intelligence organizations.
Stalin's response to this news was to order Lavrenti Beria, the head of the Secret Police, to instigate a new purge of the Communist Party.
Members of the Politburo began to panic as they saw the possibility that like previous candidates for Stalin's position as the head of the Soviet Union, they would be executed.
Fortunately for them, Stalin's health declined even further and by the end of February, 1953, he fell into a coma. After four days, Stalin briefly gained consciousness. The leading members of the party were called for. While they watched him struggling for his life, he raised his left arm.
His nurse, who was feeding him with a spoon at the time, took the view that he was pointing at a picture showing a small girl feeding a lamb. His daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, who was also at his bedside , later claimed that he appeared to be "bringing a curse on them all". Stalin then stopped breathing and although attempts were made to revive him, his doctors eventually accepted he was dead.
Three years after his death, Nikita Khrushchev, the new leader of the Soviet Union, made a speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, where he attacked the policies of Stalin. Khrushchev revealed how Stalin had been responsible for the execution of thousands of loyal communists during the purges.
In the months that followed Khrushchev's speech, thousands of those people imprisoned under Stalin were released. Those who had been in labour camps were given permission to publish their experiences. The most notable of these was the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whose powerful novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, became a world-wide bestseller.
In 1962 the official party newspaper published a poem by the poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko called the Heirs of Stalin. The poem describes the burial of Stalin but at the end suggests that the problems are not yet over: "Grimly clenching his embalmed fists, just pretending to be dead, he watched from inside. He was scheming. Had merely dozed off. And I, appealing to our government, petition them to double, and treble, the sentries guarding the slab, and stop Stalin from ever rising again."
After Khrushchev's revelations, attempts were made to erase Stalin's image from the Soviet Union. Statues and portraits of Stalin were removed from public places. Towns, streets and parks named after him were changed. Stalingrad, which had been closely associated with his generalship during both the Civil War and the Second World War, was renamed Volgagrad. Even his ashes were takes from the Kremlin Wall and placed elsewhere.
Although the superficial aspects of Stalinism was removed, the system that he created remained. Stalin had developed a state apparatus that protected those in power. It was a system that the Soviet leaders who were to follow him for the next thirty years, were only too pleased to employ in order to prevent any questioning of their policies. Writers like Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Yevgeni Yevtushenko were free to criticize Stalin but not those currently in power. The excesses of Stalinism had been removed but the structure of his totalitarian state remained until the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s.
Russian History Books
Time Search: Spartacus Educational
Forum Debates
History of Russia
Soviet Russia: Was their any Advantages
Stalin's Use of Terror
Nazism and Communism
Hungary and Fascism
Ronald Regan and the Cold War

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSstalin.htm

REMEMBER: Trans-Balkan Oil Pipelines

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MOST IMPORTANT ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS:
http://putinfreakshow.blogspot.com/2006/12/most-important-articles-and-documents.html


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Two rival oil pipelines which will cross the Balkans are:


The Russian Project: Burgas - Alexandroupolis (which crosses Bulgaria and Greece, starting from the Russian port Novorossiysk)























And the US Project: The Trans-Balkan pipeline AMBO (which crosses Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria)



















OTHER BALKAN PIPELINES:

Pan-European Pipeline: Constanta-Trieste) - a proposed oil pipeline from Constanţa in Romania via Serbia and Croatia to a point near Rijeka and from there through Slovenia to Trieste in Italy.






And, finally, the famous BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Cehyan) pipeline transporting for now Azeri oil from Baku to the Turkish Cehyan port at the Mediterranean Sea and which the US seeks extended through the Caspian Sea, in order to transport oil from Kazakhstan.








RELATED ARTICLES:

Trans-Balkan (AMBO) pipeline "the cause of the crisis in Yugoslavia"

February 16, 2001

London, February 15 (Tanjug) - According to numerous western analysts, the US project of the Trans-Balkan pipeline running from the Caspian sea to the Albanian port of Vlore, is the main cause of the tragic crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the US intervention in Kosovo and Metohija, the London Guardian writes today.


All past doubts have been rejected, and the western press did not pay attention to that, the paper reminds, stressing that it becomes more clear that this US economic interest is the leading motive of creating the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.


The London paper points to freelance researches of Keith Fisher and the US Trade and Development Agency's paper published last May, which assesses that the pipeline is a US strategic interest.


According to the paper, the pipeline will provide oil and gas to the US market worth $600m a month, adding that the pipeline is necessary because the oil coming from the Caspian sea will quickly surpass the safe capacity of the Bosphorus.


In 1998, Bill Richardson, then US energy secretary, said that the pipeline would make all countries from the Caspian to the Balkans politically and economically reliant on the West, which is also a strategic goal.


It is obvious, The Guardian writes, that the former Yugoslavia, especially Serbia, was a serious problem for the realization of the plan. The intervention in Kosovo and Metohija was carried out in order to please Albania, whose port of Vlore is the ultimate destination of the pipeline.


The project of the Trans-Balkan pipeline was made in early 90-s, and it is due for approval next month, the paper writes.

http://www.serbia-info.com/news/2001-02/16/22419.html


Pan-European Pipeline:



Pan-European is a proposed oil pipeline from Constanţa in Romania via Serbia and Croatia to a point near Rijeka and from there through Slovenia to Trieste in Italy. The aim of 1,856-kilometre long pipeline is to bypass Turkish straits in the transportation of Russian and Caspian oil. The pipeline, which would cost about 2 billion euros, will feed refineries in South-Eastern Europe, Italy, Austria and Bavaria at least with 40,000,000 ton of oil per year.
The project was proposed in 2002. The project is sponsored by so far unidentified group of industrial interests that possibly include[1] General Electric Oil and Gas, China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Chevron, Texaco and British Petroleum. Lobbyists for the project include Henry Owen, a close friend to the Bush family. Owen has written a lobbying letter to the minister of finance of Slovenia, Andrej Bajuk[1] in the first half of 2006.
National governments of Romania, Serbia and Croatia are favourable about the project. Most engaged is the President of Romania, Traian Băsescu, who has cited a study estimating the benefits of the project for Romania over 20 years of operation in the range between 2.27 to 4.39 billion US dollars.[1] Government of Slovenia is not favourable about the project, citing the following reasons: the 29 km stretch is on the environmentally sensitive Karst terrain, no national interest exists regarding oil supply, and, the memorandum proposed is too binding for the Government which can not secure a construction permit without respect to the legal siting procedure.[2]
Signing of the memorandum of understanding on the construction of the pipeline was several times delayed. An agreement to begin work on the pipeline was signed on 3 April 2007 by officials of Croatia, Italy, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia during an energy forum in Zagreb.[3]

See also
Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline
AMBO pipeline
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-European_Pipeline


Analytics: Europe’s response to Russia - Constanza-Trieste project:


[ 05 Feb 2008 16:56 ]Before Russia completed the attack on South-Eastern Europe through South Stream gas pipeline, there is something new emerging in the region.

This time European Union intends to strike on weak spot of Russia.

The ink had hardly dried on the agreements signed with participation of President Vladimir Putin, when Bulgarian President Georgi Pyrvanov stated that his country still gives political support to Nabucco gas pipeline.

Prime Minister Sergey Stanyshev even claimed that South Stream and Nabucco pipelines supplement each other.

“Some say Bulgaria betrayed European Union and supported Russia’s interests and this project is the alternative of Nabucco. It’s nonsense.”

It is interesting that this statement coincided with the statements of Sofia-accredited U.S. diplomats that Russia’s strengthening positions in the Balkans worry them.

Prime Minister of Bulgaria refused these accusations and assured that relations with Russia will not change official Sofia’s geopolitical direction towards the West.

But it seems this assuredness does not suffice everybody. Happenings in Bulgaria’s Burgas city prove it.

The residents of the city, which is the outfall of Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, the second giant energy project between Moscow and Sofia, held mass rally and protested against the project.

"Our rulers sold Bulgaria", "Don’t turn Burgas into a second Chernobyl," read the posters of the protestors, who even staged an auction and sold parts of the pipeline.

The agreement signed by Bulgaria, Russia and Greece with participation of Russian president envisages transportation of Russian oil to Aegean Sea bypassing Turkey’s Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Question arises how “Borjomi scenario” is realized around the project, which is considered as the alternative to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

But the referendum in Burgas on February 17, which will decide the fate of the pipeline, shows seriousness of the situation.

51% of the city residents are to participate in the voting, so that the referendum can be considered valid.

President Georgi Pyrvanov stated that local referendums will not influence the fate of the project.

On the other hand, Romanian President Traian Basescu’s speech about Constanza-Trieste before foreign diplomats accredited in Bucharest shows that the happenings in Burgas are no of local character.

“Nabucco pipeline is of strategic character for Romania and European Union. Direct, effective and safe delivery of the Caspian oil is possible through Constanza-Trieste pipeline,” he said.

President Basescu expressed his hope that European Union in its new policy on Central Asia will apply more suitable approach to this strategic region.

“Romania will try to achieve the goals of this policy through the relations with its strategic partners Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,” he said.

1.400 kilometer- Constanza-Trieste pipeline or Pan-European Oil Pipeline which is a competitor of Burgas-Alexandroupolis and Bulgas-Vlore pipelines will link the Black and Adriatic Seas.

Pan-European is a proposed oil pipeline from Constant,a in Romania via Serbia and Croatia to a point near Rijeka and from there through Slovenia to Trieste in Italy.

It would carry around 60 million tonnes of oil per year. The feasibility study for the project has estimated that the pipeline will commence operations in 2012.Viorel Palashka, Romanian deputy Minister of Economy stated in the middle of January that, the government supports the joining of “Gaz de France “Company and Kazakhstan to Constanza-Triesta pipeline project.

This project was the focus of attention of Bucharest along January.

This issue was debated during the visit of Romanian President Traian Basescu to Belgrade on January 29.

Serbia is a key country for this project and Constanza-Triesta pipeline became insolvent because of Kosovo crisis in 1999.

Official Bucharest assured Belgrade that its position will be close to Serbian positions.

“We debated this project with Boris Tadic I am sure that, our political and economical partnership will successfully develop,” he said.

Serbian President Boris Tadic noted that they are interested in the necessity of Constanza port and in the development of cooperation on implementation of above-said project.

Against the back drop of South stream gas pipeline Romanian-Serbian dialogue was drawn more attention last month.

Most parts of the pipeline are already built except for a connection between the city of Pitesti, Romania and the city of Pancevo, Serbia, and a section between Croatia’s northern Adriatic region through Slovenia to Trieste.

Compared to the Burgas-Alexandroupolis and AMBO pipelines, a pipeline which runs entirely across land and directly joins the central European pipeline network carries smaller risks associated with oil spills.

There is a threat that the number of tankers passing through the Turkish straits will not fall significantly and that oil pipelines would increase the total amount of oil being transported rather than replacing tanker traffic.

Bucharest and Sofia, candidates to EU competes for Pan-European pipeline and South stream gas pipeline and these countries depend on Serbia. Serbian President Boris Tadic stated that the country intends to make investment in oil infrastructure of Constanza port. (?)

It is interesting, is Gazprom which bought Serbian Oil Company last month behind the investments? /APA Analytics /

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=43725

AMBO pipeline

AMBO pipeline is a planned oil pipeline from Bulgarian Black Sea port Burgas via Macedonia to Albanian Adriatic port Vlore. The aim of the 894 kilometer long trans-Balkan pipeline is to bypass Turkish straits in transportation of Russian and Caspian oil. The pipeline is expected to cost about 1.5 billion USD and it will transport 750,000 barrels of oil per day.[1] There will be four pump stations, two in Bulgaria and one each in Macedonia and Albania, constructed along the route.
The pipeline is planned to be built and operated by the US-registered Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO). The project is backed by the US government, who financed a feasibility study of pipeline.[2]
The pipeline was proposed already in 1993. On 27 December 2004, prime-ministers of Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria signed the latest political declaration, followed by the memorandum of understanding between representatives of Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria and Ted Ferguson, the president & CEO of AMBO.[3] On 30 October 2006, Albania and Macedonia signed a protocol to determinate the entrance points of the pipeline. The entrance point will be Stebleve village in Albania and Lakaica village in Macedonia. A similar protocol between Bulgaria and Macedonia was signed later in 2006.
On 31 January 2007, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Albania signed a trilateral convention on the construction of the Balkan pipeline AMBO. This document has been ratified by the Parliaments of all three countries and will govern the construction, operation, and maintenance of the project. It goes into effect in September 2007. Environmental studies are being conducted and construction licenses need to be obtained, allowing work to commence in late 2008.[4]
Other pipeline projects (which do not compete with AMBO since they serve entirely different markets) are the Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline from Burgas to Greece Aegean port Alexandroupoli, and the Pan-European Pipeline from Constanţa in Romania to Trieste in Italy. There is also the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Compared with Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline, the AMBO pipeline is longer and more expensive, but at the same time Vlore (which is a sheltered, deep-water, all-weather port) could accommodate larger tankers and is more accessible than Alexandroupoli.[5] Also, an oil spill in the Aegean would have a negative influence on Greece’s tourism industry.[6]

[edit] See also
Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline
Pan-European Pipeline
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMBO_pipeline




Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline

The Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline is an oil pipeline that will be used to transport Russian and Caspian oil from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandroupoli. The pipeline will be an alternative route for Russian oil bypassing the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Its construction will begin in 2008, and is estimated to be completed by the beginning of 2011.[1][2]

History
The pipeline project was proposed in 1993–1994 by several Russian and Greek companies.[3] In 1994, for construction of the pipeline Greece and Bulgaria signed a bilateral agreement, followed by a memorandum of cooperation, signed by Greece and Russia.[4]
In February 1998, a Greek consortium for pipeline construction named Bapline was established, and in May 1998, a memorandum of creation of the Transbalkan Oil Pipeline Company was signed.[4] In 2000, a technical specifications and an economic evaluation of the project were prepared by the German company ILF.[3]
A joint protocol for preparing the pipeline's construction was signed by the three countries in January 2005.[5] The political memorandum between governments was signed on 12 April 2005.
In May 2006, there was a controversy in the media regarding the Bulgarian government's alleged withdrawal from the project, but this has been denied later by Bulgarian officials.[6] An inter-governmental agreement on the project was agreed on 7 February 2007, and it was signed on 15 March 2007 in Athens, by the involved ministers of the three countries, under the presence of their leaders, Vladimir Putin (Russian president), Sergey Stanishev (Bulgarian prime-minister), and Kostas Karamanlis (prime-minister of Greece).[2][7][8]

[edit] Technical features and financing
The main pipeline with a diameter of 36 inches (900 mm) will be 279 kilometres (173 mi) long, and it would transport 15-23 million tons of oil per year during the first phase, as well as 35 million during the second.[3] The pipeline would have three oil refilling stations, two of which in Bulgaria (the first one at Neftochim close to Burgas) and one at Alexandroupoli. The project includes reconstruction of Burgas and Alexandroupolis terminals, including oil tanks with a capacity of 600,000 tons in Burgas, and w1,200,000 tons in Alexandroupolis.[9]
The pipeline is expected to cost up to €1 billion.[2][10] The investment scheme is not agreed yet, and it’s not decided from which sources the pipeline will be filled.[8]

[edit] International project company
The pipeline will be constructed and owned by the international project company, which will be registered in the Netherlands. The agreement establishing the international project company was signed in Moscow on 18 December 2007.[11] 51 % of shares would be given to the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline Consortium, a joint venture of Russian Transneft, Rosneft and Gazprom Neft.[12] Bulgarian Burgas-Alexandroupolis Project Company-BG, a joint venture of Bulgargaz and Transexportstroy, will own 24.5 % of shares. Greece consortium HELPE S.A. - THRAKI S.A., a joint venture between Hellenic Petroleum and Thraki, which is owned by Prometheus Gas and the Latsis Group, will own 23.5 %, while the Government of Greece will have 1 %.[13]
There are speculations that the part of Bulgarian and Hellenic stakes could be sold to other oil companies as Chevron, TNK-BP and KazMunayGas.[8] Also Andrei Dementyev, a deputy industry and energy minister of Russia, has proposed that Kazakhstani KazMunayGas and other shareholders of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium could be get a stake in the pipeline project.[14] Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Baktykozha Izmukhambetov has said that Kazakhstan wants to buy a stake in the pipeline consortium.[15]
The ownership of the Burgas oil terminal remains unclear. Bulgarian opposition has demanded to scrap the deal if Russian companies are granted control over the terminal.[7]

[edit] Controversy
There are several competitive pipeline projects, such as the AMBO pipeline from Burgas to Vlore, Pan-European Pipeline from Constanţa to Trieste, Odessa-Brody-Plotsk pipeline, Kiykoy-Ibrice pipeline, and Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline — all aimed to transport oil from the Black Sea bypassing Turkish straits. The project of the Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline is described as one of the shortest pipeline through a plain terrain and therefore to be one of the cheapest and cost effective.[9] The critics of the the Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline project have raised environmental concerns because of oil tankers traffic in the Aegean Sea, which contains numerous submerged rocks and island populations dependent on tourism and fishing.[16] It has been mentioned that a possible oil spill in the Aegean would be devastating for Greece's tourism industry.[17]

See also:

AMBO pipeline
Pan-European Pipeline
Odessa-Brody pipeline
Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
Caspian Pipeline Consortium

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgas-Alexandroupoli_pipeline

Russia, Greece and Bulgaria sign major oil pipeline deal:



ATHENS, Greece: Russian President Valdimir Putin presided over a three-nation pipeline deal Thursday to bring Russia's fast expanding energy network to the Mediterranean Sea by 2011.
Development and energy ministers from Russia, Greece and Bulgaria signed an agreement authorizing construction of a 175-mile (280-kilometer) Russian oil pipeline from Bulgaria's Black Sea port of Burgas to Alexandroupolis, in northern Greece.
While it may mollify European worries over oil supply, the project could increase Europe's dependency on Russia at a time when emerging central Asian producers are still heavily reliant on the Russian network for delivery to energy-hungry Western consumers.
The deal was fast-tracked early last month after Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened to seek alternative routes unless economic disputes were quickly resolved.
Russia already provides Europe with a third of its oil and 40 percent of its natural gas, and the pipeline deal is likely to deepen that dependence. Russia's reliance as a supplier has been questioned after several supply disruptions resulting from price disputes between Moscow and former Soviet republics that serve as transit routes.

Joining Putin at Thursday's signing ceremony were Prime Ministers Costas Karamanlis of Greece and Sergei Stanishev of Bulgaria.
"This pipeline demonstrates how all countries can benefit, not just in the Balkans but in Europe," Putin said. "Our work was in a spirit of cooperation, friendship and partnership."
Karamanlis said: "it will also help international markets with improved access to oil at a time when energy is a fundamental global concern."
First conceived in 1993, the US$1.2 billion (€900 million) Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline will avoid Turkey's Bosphorus strait, which is burdened by long delays, transit restrictions and rising tariffs.
Crude supplies, possibly also from Kazakhstan, will still be shipped from the Russian port of Novorossiysk to Burgas, and again out from Alexandroupolis to world markets.
Three state-owned Russian firms control 51 percent in the venture, including infrastructure like pumping stations, storage facilities and loading docks, leaving EU-members Bulgaria and Greece with 24.5 percent each. The project will compete with other pipelines including Baku-Ceyhan, which skirts Russian soil and was strongly backed by the US.
Putin said the project "will have a negative impact" on existing conduits, but would aim to protect the environment and ensure safety by adopting the latest technologies.
US oil giant Chevron has indicated it may invest in the pipeline — which will be funded mainly through equity and borrowed capital — and in liquid natural gas facilities in Burgas. Bulgaria may sell its stake to private firms.
The 90-centimeter (36-inch) conduit will channel 700,000 barrels of oil a day to Greece, with potential daily capacity of 1 million barrels, or 50 million metric tons a year. Construction should begin in 2008 and take 18 months.
"The faster we set to work, the better things will turn out to be," Putin said.
Stanishev stressed the project "will attract more investments ... that could amount to hundreds of millions of euros," he said.
Some analysts, however, caution that pipeline deals increase dependence on a single source of energy.
Claudia Kemfert, an analyst at the German Institute for Economic Research, said by telephone from Berlin: "You get a strengthening of supply, but it can create higher dependency and other problems. To avoid this we need more diversification on the supply side, and to be less dependent on Russian energy."
On Monday, Matthew Bryza, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, visited Athens and expressed support for the oil pipeline.
But he added: "Where we are focusing most urgently now is diversification of gas supply ... away from its one primary supplier, Gazprom."
U.S. officials want Greece to prioritize gas from Azerbaijan in a natural gas network being built from Central Asia to Greece through Turkey, the TGI Interconnector, due to continue onto Italy after 2011.
Putin left for Moscow on Thursday afternoon.

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/15/europe/EU-GEN-Greece-Putin-Pipeline.php

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline


The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (sometimes abbreviated as BTC pipeline) is a crude oil pipeline that covers 1,768 kilometres (1,099 mi) from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It connects Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia; and Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey, hence its name. It is the second longest oil pipeline in the world after the Druzhba pipeline. The first oil that was pumped from the Baku end of the pipeline on May 10, 2005 reached Ceyhan on May 28, 2006.[1]






Planning
The Caspian Sea lies above one of the world's largest groups of oil and gas fields. As the Caspian Sea is landlocked, the transportation of oil to Western markets is complicated. During Soviet times, all transportation routes from the Caspian region were built through Russia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union started a search for new routes. Russia first insisted that the new pipeline should pass through Russian territory, then declined to participate.[2][3] A pipeline across Iran from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf would have provided the shortest route, but Iran was considered an undesirable partner for a number of reasons: its theocratic government, concerns about its nuclear program, and United States sanctions that greatly restrict Western investment (especially by American companies) in the country. The United States government opposed any route that would pass through Iran[4].
At the time, Turkey called for energy transit through Turkey, insisting that this would be the safest and most economic route for export. In the spring of 1992, the Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel made this proposal to Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. The first document on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on 9 March 1993 in Ankara.[5]
The choice of a Turkish route meant oil export from Azerbaijan via either Georgia or Armenia. For several reasons a route through Armenia was politically inconvenient, mainly because of the unresolved military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.[6] This left the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route as politically most expedient for the major parties, although it was longer and more expensive to build than the other options.
The BTC pipeline project gained momentum following the Ankara Declaration, adopted on 29 October 1998 by President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel, and President of Uzbekistan Islom Karimov. The declaration was witnessed by the United States Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, who expressed strong support for the BTC pipeline. The intergovernmental agreement in support of the BTC pipeline was signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey on 18 November 1999, during a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey.[6]

[edit] Construction
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co.) was founded during a document signing ceremony in London on 1 August 2002.[7] The official ceremony launching construction of the pipeline was held on 18 September 2002.[8] Construction began in April of 2003 and was completed in 2005. The Azerbaijan section was constructed by Consolidated Contractors International of Greece, and Georgia's section was constructed by a joint venture of France’s Spie Capag and US Petrofac Petrofac International. The Turkish section was constructed by BOTAŞ. Bechtel was the main contractor for engineering, procurement and construction.[7]

[edit] Inauguration
All together, three official inauguration ceremonies were held. On 25 May 2005, the pipeline was officially inaugurated at the Sangachal terminal by President Ilham Aliyev of the Azerbaijan Republic, President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia and President Ahmet Sezer of Turkey, joined by President Nursaltan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, as well as United States Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman.[9] The inauguration of the Georgian section of the pipeline was hosted by President Mikheil Saakashvili at the BTC pumping station near Gardabani on 12 October 2005.[10] The inauguration ceremony at the Ceyhan terminal was held on 13 July 2006.[11]
Oil that was pumped from the Baku end of the pipeline on May 10, 2005 reached Ceyhan in May 28, 2006 after a journey of 1,770 km.[1] The first oil was loaded at the Cheyhan Marine Terminal (Haydar Aliyev Terminal) onto a ship named British Hawthorn.[12] The tanker sailed away from the port on 4 June 2006 with about 600,000 barrels of crude oil. This marked the start of export of Azerbaijan’s oil via the BTC oil pipeline to world markets.

[edit] Description of the pipeline

[edit] Route
The pipeline starts from the Sangachal Terminal near Baku in Azerbaijan. The route of the pipeline crosses Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to Ceyhan. The pipeline's destination is the Ceyhan Marine Terminal (Haydar Aliyev Terminal) on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. Of its total length of 1,768 kilometres (1,099 mi), 443 kilometres (275 mi) lie in Azerbaijan, 249 kilometres (155 mi) in Georgia and 1,076 kilometres (669 mi) in Turkey. It crosses several mountain ranges at altitudes to 2,830 metres (9,300 ft).[13] It also traverses 3,000 roads, railways, and utility lines—both overground and underground—as well as 1,500 watercourses of up to 500 metres (1,600 ft) wide (in the case of the Ceyhan River in Turkey).[1] The pipeline occupies a corridor eight meters wide, and is buried along its entire length at a depth of no less than one meter.[14] Parallel to the BTC pipeline runs the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, which transports natural gas from the Sangachal Terminal to Erzurum in Turkey.[13] Between Sarız and Ceyhan, the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline will be laid along the same corridor.[15]

[edit] Technical features
The pipeline has a projected lifespan of 40 years, and when working at normal capacity, beginning in 2009, will transport 1 million barrels (160 000 m³) of oil per day. It has a capacity of 10 million barrels of oil, which will flow through the pipeline at 2 metres (6.6 ft) per second.[1] There are 8 pump stations through the pipeline route (2 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Georgia, 4 in Turkey). The project includes also the Ceyhan Marine Terminal, two intermediate pigging stations, one pressure reduction station, and 101 small block valves.[13] It was constructed from 150,000 individual joints of line pipe, each measuring 12 metres (39 ft) in length. This corresponds to a total weight of approximately 655,000 short tons (594,000 metric tons). The pipeline is 1,070 mm (42 inches) diameter for most of its length, narrowing to 865 mm (34 inches) diameter as it nears Ceyhan.[16]

[edit] Cost and financing
The pipeline cost US$3.9 billion.[17] Around 15,000 people were employed during the construction of the pipeline. Approximately 70% of BTC costs are being funded by third parties, including the World Bank's International Finance Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, export credit agencies of seven countries and a syndicate of 15 commercial banks.[13]

[edit] Source of supply
The BTC pipeline is supplied by oil from Azerbaijan's Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea. In this pipeline may also transport oil from the Kazakhstan's Kashagan oil field as well as from other oil fields in Central Asia.[2] The government of Kazakhstan had announced that it would seek to build a trans-Caspian oil pipeline from the Kazakhstani port of Aktau to Baku and in turn to the BTC pipeline. However, due to opposition to a Caspian offshore pipeline by both Russia and Iran, the oil pipeline is doubtful. Therefore Kazakhstan has announced a new project named Kazakh-Caspian Transportation System, which is scheduled to come into operation in 2010. The project includes a pipeline from Iskene to the Caspian port of Kuryk, terminals in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and construction of oil tankers.[18] The project is at the pre-feasibility stage.

[edit] Possible transhipment via Israel
It has been proposed that oil from the BTC pipeline may be transported to eastern Asia via the Israeli oil terminals at Ashkelon and Eilat, the overland trans-Israel sector being bridged by the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline owned by the Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Company (EAPC).[19][20]

[edit] Shareholders of the pipeline
The pipeline is owned by a consortium of energy companies led by BP (formerly British Petroleum), the operator of the pipeline. The shareholders of the consortium are:
BP (United Kingdom): 30.1%
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) (Azerbaijan): 25.00%
Chevron (USA): 8.90%
StatoilHydro (Norway): 8.71%
Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO) (Turkey): 6.53%
Eni/Agip (Italy): 5.00%
Total (France): 5.0%
Itochu (Japan): 3.4%
Inpex (Japan): 2.50%
ConocoPhillips (USA): 2.50%
Hess Corporation (USA) 2.36%[11]

[edit] Controversial aspects

[edit] Politics
Even before its completion, the BTC pipeline was affecting the world's oil politics. The South Caucasus, previously seen as Russia's backyard, is now a region of great strategic significance to other great powers. The U.S. and other Western nations have consequently become much more closely involved in the affairs of the three nations through which oil will flow. Some have criticized this degree of western involvement in the South Caucasus, arguing that it has led to an unhealthy dependence on undemocratic leaders.[citation needed] The countries themselves though have been trying to use the involvement as a counterbalance to Russian and Iranian economic and military dominance in the region.[14][21] It is seen similarly by Russian specialists claiming that the pipeline is aimed to weaken the Russian influence in Caucasus. The Russian Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Konstantin Kosachev even stated that the United States and other Western countries are planning to settle their soldiers in Caucasus on the pretext of instability in regions where the pipeline passes through.[22]
The project also constitutes an important leg of the East-West energy corridor, gaining Turkey greater geopolitical importance. The BTC pipeline also supports Georgia's independence from Russian influence. Former President Eduard Shevardnadze, one of the architects and initiators of the project, saw the construction of the pipeline through Georgian territory as a certain guarantee for the country's future economic and political security and stability. This view has been fully shared by his successor President Mikhail Saakashvili. "All strategic contracts in Georgia, especially the contract for the Caspian pipeline are a matter of survival for the Georgian state," he told reporters on 26 November 2003.[citation needed]

[edit] Economics
Although some have touted the BTC pipeline as potentially removing the dependence of the US and other Western nations on oil from the Middle East, in reality it doesn't change global dependence on Middle Eastern oil as it supplies only 1% of global demand during its first stage.[citation needed] However, the pipeline diversifies the global oil supply and so insures, to an extent, against a failure in supply elsewhere. Critics of the pipeline—particularly Russia—are skeptical about its economic prospects and see this as politically motivated.[23]
Construction of the BTC pipeline has contributed significantly to the economies of the host countries. In the first half of 2007, a year after the completion and launch of BTC pipeline as the main export route for Azerbaijani oil, the real GDP growth of Azerbaijan hit a record of 35%.[24] Substantial transit fees accrues to Georgia and Turkey. For Georgia the transit fees are expected to produce an average of US$62.5 million per year.[21] Turkey is expected to receive approximately US$200 million in transit fees per year in the initial years of operation, with the possibility of increasing to US$290 million per year from year 17 to year 40. Turkey is also benefitting from an increase in economic activity in eastern Anatolia, including increased importance of the port of Ceyhan, which had experienced significant reductions of activities since the 1991 Gulf War.[25] The reduction of oil tanker traffic on the Bosphorus will contribute to greater security for Istanbul.[26]
One of the concerns related to the use of oil revenues is the level of corruption. To counter concerns that oil money would be siphoned off by corrupt officials, Azerbaijan has set up a State oil fund (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, or SOFAZ), expressly mandated with using natural-resource revenue to benefit future generations, to bolster support from key international lenders and improve transparency and accountability. SOFAZ is audited by Deloitte and Touche. Additionally, Azerbaijan became the first oil producing country in the world to join EITI — the British-led Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative.[14]

[edit] Security
Concerns have also been addressed about the security of the BTC pipeline.[27][28] It deliberately bypasses the border of Armenia (with which Azerbaijan is still technically at war over the status of the Armenian-populated separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan), crosses through Georgia (which has two unresolved separatist conflicts) and goes through the edges of the Kurdish region of Turkey (which has seen a prolonged and bitter conflict with separatist terrorists).[29] It will require constant guarding to prevent sabotage, though the fact that almost all of the pipeline is buried will make it harder to attack.[14]

[edit] Environment
Several ecological issues had been raised concerning the BTC pipeline. Critics of the pipeline have pointed out that the region through which it travels is highly seismic, suffering from frequent earthquakes. The route takes the pipeline through three active faults in Azerbaijan, four in Georgia and seven in Turkey. The pipeline's engineers have equipped it with a number of technical solutions to reduce its vulnerability to earth movements. However, the BTC pipeline for almost half of its entire route goes through the same territory as the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which has been in operation since 1999 and has an exemplary safety record.
The pipeline crosses the watershed of the Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park (albeit not entering the park territory), an area of mineral water springs and outstanding natural beauty in Georgia.[30] This has long been the subject of fierce opposition by environmental activists. Since the pipeline is buried for its entire length, constructing it has left a highly visible scar across the landscape. The Oxford-based "Baku Ceyhan Campaign" averred that "public money should not be used to subsidise social and environmental problems, purely in the interests of the private sector, but must be conditional on a positive contribution to the economic and social development of people in the region."[citation needed] As the Borjomi mineral water is a major export commodity of Georgia, any oil spills there would have a catastrophic effect on the viability of the local water bottling industry.
The field joint coating of the pipeline has also been an area of controversy as there were shortcomings in tests of used sealant SPC 2888.[31] BP and its contractors interrupted work until the problem was eliminated.[25]
On the positive side, the BTC pipeline eliminates 350 tanker cargoes per year through the sensitive and very congested Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The World Bank as a condition of financing required the use of catalytic converters on the 18 large Wärtsilä engine driven compressors used to transport the oil through the pipeline in the Turkish portion. Consequently each of the 7600 hp engines have reduced their carbon dioxide and volatile organic compounds emissions by greater than 90% providing a significant air quality improvement over the 350 tanker shipments through the Bosphorus.[32]

[edit] Human rights
Human rights activists criticized Western governments for the pipeline, due to reported human and civil rights abuses by the Aliyev regime.[33] A Czech documentary film Zdroj (Source) underscores these human rights abuses, such as eminent domain violations in appropriating land for the pipeline's route, and criticism of the government leading to arrest.[34] The project was also criticized by the Kurdish Human Rights Project.

[edit] In fiction
The BTC pipeline has been featured (in fictional form) in popular culture: it was a central plot point in the James Bond film The World Is Not Enough (1999). One of the film's central characters, Elektra King, is responsible for the construction of an oil pipeline through the Caucasus, from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. Named the "King pipeline" in the film, it is a thinly disguised version of the BTC.[29]

[edit] See also

Wikinews has related news:
First pipeline opens from Caspian Sea
Economy of Azerbaijan
Foreign relations of Azerbaijan
Foreign relations of Georgia
Foreign relations of Turkey
Geostrategy in Central Asia
Petroleum politics
Dutch disease

Putin's Compromises at the NATO summit

HOME PAGE: http://putinfreakshow.blogspot.com/

MOST IMPORTANT ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS:
http://putinfreakshow.blogspot.com/2006/12/most-important-articles-and-documents.html


As expected, NATO's MAP (Membership Action Plan) has been delayed for Ukraine and Georgia. Croatia and Albania got green NATO light, receiving the MAP, while Macedonia hasn't got it yet.

In Poland and the Czech Republic only passive military equipment will be installed, such as radars, but not (Patriot) anti-ballistic missiles, decision which will persuade Russia to change its mind on quitting the CFE Treaty:

"Washington plans to station components of its missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Poland will host ten interceptors and the Czech Republic will have a radar station. The first interceptor could be put into airborne alert in Europe already by 2011, while the full-scale deployment of ten interceptors is to be completed by 2013." (Kommersant)

In return, Putin has promised to ease the US' difficulties in Afghanistan by various means, topic which I don't see such important, since Iraq and Afghanistan will remain open battlefields.

Ukraine is on its way out of the Russian orbite though, since "Ukraine's nuclear power company Energoatom signed a five-year contract with U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company to provide nuclear fuel to three Ukrainian reactors after 2020" (RIA Novosti).

Ukraine won't host military bases though, as it is prohibited by the constitution.

The Black Sea Fleet Treaty and the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty between Russia and Ukraine further complicate the future status of Ukraine.

At the bilateral Bush-Putin summit in Sochi, in exchange for Kosovo's independence, Putin will seek to gain independence for Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdniester and possibly even for Nagorno-Karaback, breakaway republics where Russia holds important military facilities, although the independence of these internationally not recognised states won't be gained over night, but probably it will go hand in hand with Georgia and Ukraine's NATO integration.

Mirroring Georgia's increasing pro-NATO status, Venezuela is still in the cards, stuffed with more Russian military hardware.

Since the US' planned shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, Georgia and Ukraine's future integration in NATO, as well as the fate of these breakaway provinces are all connected to the CFE Treaty one way or another, a way for bypassing the CFE treaty is sought, though by peaceful means ("The Sochi talks are seen as a chance to forge a concrete agreement on political differences over issues such as missile defence and the CFE treaty" (Russia Today)) . We'll see what will be achieved there.

The fact that Putin insisted to have a bilateral talk with the Romanian president is a good sign. Hopefully, after the discussion held in Bucharest, the US' base in Romania will lose its apetite for growing and Romania will eventually display a more balanced external policy, at least in the upcoming future.

Conclusion: Practically, as usual, Putin just seeks to gain some more time.

~by Vera


QUOTES:

Ukraine won’t host military bases as it is prohibited by the constitution.

http://www.kommersant.com/p-12300/Ukraine_NATO/


the policy pursued by the Ukrainian government will become openly pro-American

An official document called "Priorities of the Ukraine-US cooperation" (a roadmap) signed on the day of George Bush’s visit can prove this. Ukraine particularly undertook a commitment "to conduct a coordinated information policy regarding NATO," construction of a waste nuclear fuel storage facility, search for ways of technical cooperation under the antimissile system. Besides, we shall take part in military missions on the side of the United States. For instance, even before the summit was over, defense minister Yekhanurov announced that the Ukrainian troops in Afghanistan would be increased," the expert concluded.

http://www.regnum.ru/english/982001.html


In late March (2008), Ukraine's nuclear power company Energoatom signed a five-year contract with U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company to provide nuclear fuel to three Ukrainian reactors at the Yuzhnoukrainsky nuclear power plant in 2011-2015.

Last year, it held energetic talks with Canadian companies on the construction of CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactors, the older relatives of the Chernobyl reactor, which exploded in 1986.

These two instances show Ukraine's desire to ease its dependence on Russia. Ukraine has 15 VVER water-moderated water-cooled reactors built during Soviet times, which use fuel imported from Russia.

Westinghouse is to supply 630 fuel assemblies for the annual recharging of at least three VVER blocks.

Ukraine acted impulsively, signing the contract with the U.S. company during negotiations on Russian fuel deliveries after 2010.

Finland has recently decided to continue buying Russian fuel for its Russian-built reactors and declined Westinghouse's offer

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080402/102834109.html


Russia and NATO agreed that Russia would open its territory for the ground transit of nonmilitary cargo to Afghanistan, RIA Novosti reported with reference to Russia’s Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin. The parties will exchange the respective letters April 4, Rogozin said.

Regardless, the timing of Rogozin’s statement is illustrative. The ambassador confirmed Russia’s readiness to the transit after the alliance decided against granting MAP to Tbilisi and Kiev. The issue of further integration of those states into NATO has been put off at least till the end of 2008.

http://www.kommersant.com/p-12302/r_527/Afghanistan_NATO_cargo/

Washington plans to station components of its missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Poland will host ten interceptors and the Czech Republic will have a radar station.The first interceptor could be put into airborne alert in Europe already by 2011, while the full-scale deployment of ten interceptors is to be completed by 2013

http://www.kommersant.com/p-12295/r_500/Missile_defense_Czech_U.S./

NATO's blessing of U.S. plans for a "missile shield" defense system in Europe and signs it will get the tacit consent of Russia has put pressure on Poland to wrap up talks with Washington on hosting the hardware.


the United States will meet Poland halfway on its demands, leaving Tusk with a dilemma -- whether to accept a slightly less attractive deal


"Now when NATO has backed the plan and Russia seems to have reconciled itself to the idea, Poland has little choice but to accept the shield," said Zbigniew Lewicki, an expert on Polish-U.S. relations at the Warsaw University.

the Czech Republic, its fellow former Soviet satellite, has agreed to host the second element of the shield, a giant radar that is the backbone of the system, without any military aid conditions.


Polish officials insist they will not scale down the long list of weapons they are seeking, including anti-missile Patriot batteries to shield Polish cities from a medium-range missile attack.


Analysts and diplomats say the U.S. side is ready to meet some Polish requests but sees others as unreasonable.

"Polish generals made some outlandish demands but it is not even clear whether Poland really needs the stuff they asked for,"


The Patriots are a case in point because the Pentagon and even some Polish experts doubt Poland faces a risk of being shot at from the medium range.


http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0471743620080404?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0



(Ukraine): The treaty’s signing and ratification in April 1999 was closely linked to Ukraine’s ratification of the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. It guarantees to us the right to keep the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for 25 years. Back when I was the prime minister, I once came to the Federation Council session that discussed the ratification of a general agreement with Ukraine. Our senators, and they were right, did not want to ratify it without Ukraine’s ratification of the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. In its turn, Ukraine did not want to ratify it without our ratification of the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty.


http://www.kommersant.com/p876267/r_527/Evgeny_Primakov_analyses_the_NATO_summits_consequences/


Putin says Russia will support Abkhazia and S. Ossetia


http://en.rian.ru/world/20080403/102935645.html


FULL-LENGTH ARTICLES:


Ukraine's nuclear authorities are playing with fire

Ukraine Promised NATO Membership
The NATO-Ukrainian commission sits in Bucharest Friday, RIA Novosti reported. The alliance partnership with Ukraine is firm, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made clear when opening the event.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko called the NATO move historic. NATO softened yesterday the refusal to grant MAP to Ukraine and Georgia. The alliance pledged to invite two nations in future, adding that Moscow would have no influence on the membership decisions of NATO. It was clearly said at the summit that Ukraine will become NATO member, Yushchenko announced. Of all states, Ukraine is the only one that takes part in all operations of the alliance without being its member, the president reminded, confirming, however, that Ukraine won’t host military bases as it is prohibited by the constitution.
www.kommersant.com

http://www.kommersant.com/p-12300/Ukraine_NATO/


Ukrainian political analyst: NATO MAP for Ukraine and Georgia is a tool of diplomatic game between the Old Europe and USA

Read it in Russian
Rejection of Ukraine’s appeal for NATO MAP in practice has nothing to do with Ukraine. Ukraine as well as Georgia have become a tool of a diplomatic game between the Old Europe and the USA, Ukrainian political analyst Semyon Uralov told a REGNUM correspondent today, on April 4.
"Germany and France are thus gaining more of their sovereignty within NATO frameworks than they have it now. Ukraine has become just a tool of blackmailing of Americans first of all by Germans," the expert said. According to him, the Old Europe did not care about Ukraine at all, which is actually normal. "They are up to their profoundly pragmatic interests, the main one of which is, undoubtedly, easing the external influence by the USA. Their second goal is to have normal partner relation with Russia, because both Germany and the United States do comprehend "against whom" NATO is expanding. Thus, the Ukrainian opposition was lucky when Germans and French decided to reject Americans," the analyst continued.
"The resolution of the Bucharest summit means the only thing: that the policy pursued by the Ukrainian government will become openly pro-American. They want to be granted a MAP as a false cover to carry out a pro-American and anti-Russian foreign policy and a discriminating domestic policy. So, the Euroatlantists have failed only in terms of rhetoric. It will make it hem difficult for them from now on to conceal their real goals and actions. But no changes in the practical policy will take place," Uralov noted. "An official document called "Priorities of the Ukraine-US cooperation" (a roadmap) signed on the day of George Bush’s visit can prove this. Ukraine particularly undertook a commitment "to conduct a coordinated information policy regarding NATO," construction of a waste nuclear fuel storage facility, search for ways of technical cooperation under the antimissile system. Besides, we shall take part in military missions on the side of the United States. For instance, even before the summit was over, defense minister Yekhanurov announced that the Ukrainian troops in Afghanistan would be increased," the expert concluded.

http://www.regnum.ru/english/982001.html

Ukraine's nuclear authorities are playing with fire

21:01 02/ 04/ 2008
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti commentator Tatyana Sinitsyna) - Ukrainian politicians have made one more move aimed at easing their dependence on Russia's nuclear fuel supplies.
In late March (2008), Ukraine's nuclear power company Energoatom signed a five-year contract with U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company to provide nuclear fuel to three Ukrainian reactors at the Yuzhnoukrainsky nuclear power plant in 2011-2015.
Last year, it held energetic talks with Canadian companies on the construction of CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactors, the older relatives of the Chernobyl reactor, which exploded in 1986.
These two instances show Ukraine's desire to ease its dependence on Russia. Ukraine has 15 VVER water-moderated water-cooled reactors built during Soviet times, which use fuel imported from Russia. Westinghouse is to supply 630 fuel assemblies for the annual recharging of at least three VVER blocks.
Although diversification is a noble goal, the operation of nuclear power plants is highly complicated. Safety alone should encourage Ukraine to use nuclear fuel for which its nuclear power plants were designed, i.e. fuel made in Russia.
The Chernobyl tragedy should have been enough warning for Ukraine, but political ambitions have proven to be stronger than fear.
Khusein Chechenov, a member of the Russian parliamentary subcommittee on nuclear energy, said, "It was a political decision taken without due regard for economic or scientific considerations."
According to him, the contract is a mistake made deliberately to spite Moscow.
Westinghouse's fuel assemblies are 25% more expensive than those provided by Russia's TVEL Corporation and their quality is questionable. Ukraine acted impulsively, signing the contract with the U.S. company during negotiations on Russian fuel deliveries after 2010.
The contract includes quite a few reservations, such as Ukraine's right to terminate it if its regulators do not permit the use of American fuel, or if the assemblies malfunction.
Why sign an agreement with such reservations? Experts say that the use of Westinghouse assemblies in Russian-made reactors will considerably increase the risk of an accident at the Yuzhnoukrainsky nuclear power plant.
Finland has recently decided to continue buying Russian fuel for its Russian-built reactors and declined Westinghouse's offer, and the use of American fuel at the Temelin plant in the Czech Republic nearly caused an accident. Accordingly, Czech authorities have decided to use Russian technologies despite political considerations.
The management of the Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary entrusted the cleaning of fuel assemblies at its second block to the French-German company Framatome ANP. The use of an "alien" technology resulted in the malfunction of 30 fuel assemblies and almost caused an accident. The Hungarian authorities called on Russian specialists for help, who managed to remedy the situation only three and a half years later.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, which investigated the fuel-cleaning incident at Paks, rated it Level 3, a serious incident, by the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
The transition to new technology is a very expensive and difficult process that entails changing the mentality, infrastructure and technical policy, and retraining specialists. Countries hardly ever do this without proper preparation.
Sergei Komarov, deputy director of the Russian Institute of Regional Energy Development, said, "Using Westinghouse fuel in Russian-made reactors at Ukrainian nuclear power plants is highly risky. I would say that using equipment that has proved unreliable is an irresponsible decision."
Yuri Stuzhev, former director of Russia's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk, near Moscow, said, "Ukraine should have studied the experience of other countries. Or are diversification plans more important to it than the safety of its people? What if an accident happens at the nuclear power plant because of the use of low-quality American fuel assemblies? Who would be held responsible?"
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080402/102834109.html


Russia Sanctions Transit of NATO Nonmilitary Cargo to Afghanistan

Russia and NATO agreed that Russia would open its territory for the ground transit of nonmilitary cargo to Afghanistan, RIA Novosti reported with reference to Russia’s Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin. The parties will exchange the respective letters April 4, Rogozin said.
The matter at stake, Rogozin went on, is the delivery of mostly humanitarian cargo for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Russia won’t refuse to deliver the alliance’s cargo despite the clashes on potential membership of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO, RF Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said not long ago. Regardless, the timing of Rogozin’s statement is illustrative. The ambassador confirmed Russia’s readiness to the transit after the alliance decided against granting MAP to Tbilisi and Kiev. The issue of further integration of those states into NATO has been put off at least till the end of 2008.At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov also declared readiness to open the transit corridor for nonmilitary cargo of NATO.
www.kommersant.com

U.S., Czech Republic Agreed on Missile Defense

The United States and the Czech Republic have completed in Bucharest the negotiations on stationing components of the U.S. missile defense shield.
"The United States and the Czech Republic are pleased to announce the completion of negotiations on a missile defense agreement. We plan to sign the agreement in the near future," Reuters quoted the statement of both countries. The parties intend to ink the agreement in May, The Associated Press reported.Washington plans to station components of its missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Poland will host ten interceptors and the Czech Republic will have a radar station.The first interceptor could be put into airborne alert in Europe already by 2011, while the full-scale deployment of ten interceptors is to be completed by 2013. Russia opposes deployment of the third position area of the U.S. missile defense shield in Europe, seeing it a threat to the national security.
www.kommersant.com

http://www.kommersant.com/p-12295/r_500/Missile_defense_Czech_U.S./


Pressure mounts on Poland over "missile shield"

By Adam Jasser - Analysis
WARSAW (Reuters) - NATO's blessing of U.S. plans for a "missile shield" defense system in Europe and signs it will get the tacit consent of Russia has put pressure on Poland to wrap up talks with Washington on hosting the hardware.
Poland has set tough conditions for agreeing to base 10 U.S. interceptor rockets on its soil, including that the United States spend billions of dollars on modernizing Polish air defenses.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk has also urged Washington to persuade Russia to drop its opposition, saying Warsaw can ill afford bad relations with its big neighbor and former overlord.
The final demand was that NATO endorse missile defense, after a number of Poland's European Union partners, who are also members of the alliance, reacted coolly to the idea.
With the last two requirements seemingly satisfied after this week's NATO summit, Poland will now find it hard to back out without seriously harming relations with Washington, even if it does not get all the weaponry it wants, analyst say.
Diplomats say talks on the shield are making progress. A U.S. team arrived in Warsaw this week to reassess Poland's conditions and more detailed talks will follow in coming weeks.
They predict the United States will meet Poland halfway on its demands, leaving Tusk with a dilemma -- whether to accept a slightly less attractive deal, or walk away with no new weapons and Poland's relationship with the United States badly damaged.
Picking the latter option could win Tusk some friends in Europe, where Poland's close ties with Washington have been viewed with suspicion, but would cause a backlash at home.
Analysts say the conservative opposition, led by President Lech Kaczynski, would pounce, accusing Tusk of destroying a U.S. relationship that has been the pillar of Polish security since the overthrow of communism in 1989.
That argument would resonate strongly with the Polish public, even if it is skeptical about the shield itself.
LEVERAGE
"Now when NATO has backed the plan and Russia seems to have reconciled itself to the idea, Poland has little choice but to accept the shield," said Zbigniew Lewicki, an expert on Polish-U.S. relations at the Warsaw University.
The Republican U.S. administration is keen to finalize negotiations before President George W. Bush's term in office ends later this year -- a fact some Polish officials believe gives them leverage to press their demands.
Others believe Poland runs the risk of overplaying its hand and could see the deal slip away to another European country.
They point out that the Czech Republic, its fellow former Soviet satellite, has agreed to host the second element of the shield, a giant radar that is the backbone of the system, without any military aid conditions.
Polish officials insist they will not scale down the long list of weapons they are seeking, including anti-missile Patriot batteries to shield Polish cities from a medium-range missile attack.
They point to a promise President George W. Bush gave to Tusk in Washington in March, that the United States would meet Polish expectations.

They argue the Polish public, which is largely skeptical about the shield, would not accept a deal that failed to boost Polish defenses in a tangible way.
Analysts and diplomats say the U.S. side is ready to meet some Polish requests but sees others as unreasonable.
"Polish generals made some outlandish demands but it is not even clear whether Poland really needs the stuff they asked for," one source familiar with the talks said.
The Patriots are a case in point because the Pentagon and even some Polish experts doubt Poland faces a risk of being shot at from the medium range.
"The Polish generals' argument is 'give us the toys and don't worry how we are going to use them'," a diplomat familiar with the negotiations added.
(Reporting by Adam Jasser; editing by Andrew Roche)

http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0471743620080404?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0

NATO Summit: Winners and Losers

Who won and who lost by the summit in Bucharest? Definitely, those have lost who were scampering to NATO despite the step’s possible consequences. And the consequences are obvious: society’s split in Ukraine, and aggravation in Ukraine’s and Georgia’s relations with Russia. At the same time, I would not state that Russia has won. On the one hand, the events showed that Russia’s opinion is taken into account. That can be considered a significant achievement for Russia, which strives to be a full-right player on the international arena. On the other hand, we should have no illusions: the events in Bucharest do not put the kybosh on Georgia’s and Ukraine’s aspiration to NATO.
Paradoxically as it is, I believe the U.S. is among those who won. President Bush firmly said to Ukraine and Georgia that he stands for accepting them to NATO, and thus strengthened U.S. positions in the countries’ ruling elites. Yet, Bush now faces a meeting with Vladimir Putin. I dare hope he is interested in the meeting’s success. Meanwhile, chances for success would have been smaller, had Ukraine and Georgia been put in Bucharest onto the rails leading into NATO.The summit in Bucharest passed at the background of discussion devoted to the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty between Russia and Ukraine. Russia is interested in normal, or even good relations with Ukraine. At the same time, it is in Russia’s interests that there are more and more Ukrainians who are against the country’s accession to NATO. According to different estimations, over a half of the population is against now. I believe Russia’s exit from the treaty with Ukraine will both exacerbate the bilateral relations and increase the number of Ukrainians wishing to join NATO.There is another point too. The treaty’s signing and ratification in April 1999 was closely linked to Ukraine’s ratification of the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. It guarantees to us the right to keep the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for 25 years. Back when I was the prime minister, I once came to the Federation Council session that discussed the ratification of a general agreement with Ukraine. Our senators, and they were right, did not want to ratify it without Ukraine’s ratification of the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. In its turn, Ukraine did not want to ratify it without our ratification of the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty. Then, I suggested a way to exit the stalemate – to pass a two-point ratification law. First point – to ratify. Second point – to exchange ratification letters after Ukraine’s parliament issues the law on ratifying the Black Sea Fleet Treaty. The solution was found. Shall we forget that bond? We also have many other opportunities to display our discontent to Ukraine due to its current policy without breaking up the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty.Speaking of Russia-NATO cooperation’s prospects, we have stable relations with the alliance, and there exists the Russia-NATO Council. I believe these relations will be maintained to mutual use, considering our realistic approach to NATO’s activities.

http://www.kommersant.com/p876267/r_527/Evgeny_Primakov_analyses_the_NATO_summits_consequences/

Putin says Russia will support Abkhazia and S. Ossetia
20:57 03/ 04/ 2008
MOSCOW, April 3 (RIA Novosti) - Russia will provide all the necessary support and assistance to Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian Foreign Ministry said quoting President Vladimir Putin.
Georgia is seeking to regain control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which proclaimed independence following the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Tbilisi accuses Moscow of encouraging separatism and interfering in its internal affairs.
"The Russian president stressed that Russia is not unsympathetic to the aspirations and problems to the two republics' population, where many Russian nationals live," the ministry said.
Earlier the presidents of the two breakaway republics expressed in a statement to Putin their concerns over the "aggressive course by the Georgian authorities to destabilize the situation in the conflict zones, Georgia's militarization, the build up of offensive weapons and troops close to the borders of the [self-proclaimed] republics."
The Russian president said that all Georgia's attempts to resolve the situation by applying pressure on Abkhazia and South Ossetia are senseless.
"Any attempts to apply political, economic or especially military pressure on Abkhazia and South Ossetia are futile and counterproductive," the ministry said citing Putin.
Sergei Bagapsh, the president of Abkhazia, said in an interview with RIA Novosti that Putin's statement would "guarantee security for our republics. This is how I understood it."
Two weeks ago the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, proposed that the president and the government consider the issue of whether to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Ex-Soviet breakaway regions have stepped up their drive for independence since Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with Moldova's Transdnestr, have since asked Russia's parliament, the United Nations and other organizations to recognize their independence.
Peacekeeping in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone is currently carried out by collective CIS forces staffed with Russian service personnel. The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict area is controlled by joint forces also including Russian peacekeepers.

http://en.rian.ru/world/20080403/102935645.html